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NEWS & PUBLICATIONS

Faculty Notes
Professor Don Leatherman had two articles accepted for publication in T AX S TRATEGIES
FOR CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, DISPOSITIONS, SPIN-OFFS,
JOINT V ENTURES, AND O THER STRATEGIC ALLIANCES,
FINANCINGS , REORGANIZATIONS AND RESTRUCTURING . The
articles are entitled Shifting of Member Stock Basis Under § 1.302-2(c) and Extraordinary Gain and
Loss Disallowance. In March 2000, College of
Law faculty granted tenure to Professor
Leatherman.
Professor Robert Lloyd’s latest work is an
article on the new Article 9 of the UCC. The
article will appear in the TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW in
two parts beginning with the 1999-2000 winter
edition.
The TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW published Professor Colleen Medill’s article, HIPAA and Its Related Legislation: A New Role for ERISA in the Regulation of Private Health Care Plans? , 65 T ENN . L.
R EV . 485-510 (1998). Professor Medill recently
addressed the UT College of Law faculty regarding recent trends and legal developments in private, employer-sponsored retirement plans. Additionally, Professor Medill presented “Redesigning Federal Retirement Laws for an Age of Individual Responsibility” at the annual meeting of
the Southeastern Association of American Law
Schools. Finally, she addressed the annual meeting of the Tennessee Chapter of the Corporate
Counsel Association, discussing Employer Fiduciary Liability Under ERISA for Participant Retirement Savings Education and Investment Advice.
Professor Carl Pierce spoke at the Sixth
Annual Tennessee Corporate Counsel Institute in
October 1998. His topic was Current Developments Affecting the Professional Responsibilities of
Corporate Counsel.
Professor Thomas E. Plank, who has
taught at the UT College of Law for the past five
years, was granted tenure by the University of
Tennessee Board of Trustees effective August 1,
1999. Professor Plank teaches Contracts II, DebtorCreditor Law, Commercial Law, and Representing Enterprises.
Professor Plank published two articles in
January of 1999. The first, The Outer Boundaries of the Bankruptcy Estate, was published in
Spring 2000

the Emory Law Journal. The second, Why Bankruptcy Judges Need Not and Should Not Be Article
III Judges, was published by the A MERICAN BANK RUPTCY L AW JOURNA L after having been solicited at
the suggestion of U.S. Court of Appeals Judge
Edith Jones. The MARYLAND L AW REVIEW will publish Plank’s article, Creditors in Possession Under
the Bankruptcy Code: History, Text, and Policy, in
the Spring of 2000. He is currently writing a
short article entitled, The Bankruptcy Trust as a
Legal Person, with plans to write two articles entitled, The Efficiency of Securitization and The Secure Legal Foundations of Securitization. In May
of 1999 Professor Plank presented The Firm Legal Foundations of Securitization at the American Bar Association, Section of Real Property,
Probate and Trust Law in Washington, D.C., and
testified for the United States as an expert witness on mortgage-backed securities in a criminal
racketeering trial, United States v. Weiss, heard by
the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Florida.
Professor Gregory M. Stein’s most recent
article, The Scope of the Borrower’s Liability in a
Nonrecourse Real Estate Loan, appeared in the
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW (55 Washington &
Lee L. Rev. 1207 (Fall 1998)). His next article,
Who Gets the Takings Claim? Changes in Land Use
Law Pre-Enactment Owners, and Post-Enactment
Buyers, has been accepted for publication by the
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL and is slated to appear in
the Spring of 2000. He has presented earlier versions of the article to the UT Law Faculty and to
the Southeastern Conference of the Association
of American Law Schools at its annual meeting.
In May of 1999 Professor Stein spoke at the Practicing Law Institute’s program on Commercial Real
Estate Financing in Atlanta. He was a participant
in two panel discussions entitled Letters of Credit,
Participations, Nonrecourse, and UCC Collateral
and Trouble Ahead: Lender’s First Ten Steps Before Acceleration. His chapter on nonrecourse
lending also appeared in PLI’s published volume
of course materials. Professor Stein is currently
co-authoring a book entitled COMMERCIAL REAL E STATE LAW IN PRACTICE , which is scheduled for publication by Harcourt Brace Professional Publishing
in the summer of 2000. In March 2000 the College of Law faculty granted full professorship to
Professor Stein.
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Entrepreneurial Law Center
Receives $1 Million Gift
One of the nation’s most
successful entrepreneurs and his
wife have made a gift of $1
million to the University of Tennessee College of Law.
Jim Clayton, the CEO and
Chairman of the Board of Knoxville (Tenn.)-based Clayton
Homes, Inc., and his wife Kay
made the gift to the College of Law’s Entrepreneurial Law Center, which shall henceforth be
known as the Clayton Center for Entrepreneurial
Law. Clayton is a 1964 UT law graduate.
“We are extremely grateful for this gift from
Jim and Kay Clayton, which will allow our Center for Entrepreneurial Law to flourish,” said UT
Law Dean Thomas C. Galligan, Jr. “The gift will
allow the Center to continue its groundbreaking
work in training and informing lawyers, students,
and business people about the legal aspects of
business. We are proud to claim Jim Clayton as
one of our graduates and are eager to work with
him and Kay in the years ahead on this exciting
project.”
The Clayton Center for Entrepreneurial Law
provides an academic concentration in business
transactions for law students, as well as educational and support programs for legal practitioners, business professionals, and the public.
Reflecting on his gift, Clayton remarked,
“Some aspects of legal training encourage some
students to leave law school with confrontational,
combative, and even in some situations an antagonistic attitude towards business. Too, the students may not recognize fully the opportunity
available to assist in the start up and early growth
stages of young businesses.
“To encourage positive and pro-active representation of businesses and individuals, the
mission of the Clayton Center for Entrepreneurial
Law is to educate students and heighten their
awareness of the need and opportunity to support and guide entrepreneurs from the start up
phase through the transformation into successful,
productive enterprises.”
Volume 1 Number 2
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In April 1998 Clayton was selected as the
College of Law’s first Distinguished Entrepreneur
in Residence. At that time he shared his views
about business lawyers and business law with
the law school faculty and student body.
“When Jim Clayton visited the College of
Law as the first Distinguished Entrepreneur in
Residence nothing was more apparent than his
interest in the well-being of our students,” said
Prof. Carl Pierce, director of the Center. “The
Clayton’s gift enables us to look forward to an
exciting and productive future for the Center.”
Clayton opened his first sales center for
manufactured homes on Knoxville’s Clinton Highway in 1966, and within two years his operation
was the largest in the world. Clayton opened the
company’s first manufacturing plant in 1970, and
today 19 plants supply homes to more than 1000company owned and independent dealers in 28
states.
In addition, Clayton Homes also finances and
insures manufactured homes and operates communities in a 27-state market.
Clayton worked his way through the University of Tennessee, Knoxville buying and selling used cars during the late 1950s, while an
undergraduate student majoring in electrical engineering. Later, Jim and his brother Joe opened
an automobile dealership in Knoxville while Jim
was a law student. Jim used a loan from Clayton
Motors to found Clayton Homes in 1966.
“I credit much of my success to the UT College of Law,” Clayton said in a piece he wrote
recently that appeared in a College of Law publication entitled LAWYERS OF THE PRESENT. “There the
case studies came alive because I could relate
the facts directly to issues in my own business
life. The contacts and relationships developed
there have given me a networking asset that I
have called upon frequently.”

Business Courses Prepare Students
for Transactional Practice
The University of Tennessee College of Law
has designed an innovative program to prepare
students to be transactional attorneys and/or entrepreneurs. The program offers a broad specSpring 2000
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trum of classes to appeal to each student’s business-oriented interests. Those classes include
Income Tax, Corporate and Partnership Tax, Land
Finance, Commercial Law, Business Associations,
and Intellectual Property. To complement those
classes, students concentrating in business are
also required to enroll in Contract Drafting and
Representing Enterprises. Those classes expose
students to “skills-based” learning by teaching
students how to deal with real-life business situations.

ments students draft during a typical semester.
Checklists, client letters, and opinion letters are
also written. The combination of all of these
factors makes Contract Drafting one of the most
successful courses in preparing future transactional attorneys for practice.

The Contract Drafting course is highly successful
in equipping future transactional attorneys with the tools
necessary to draft effective contracts. The course’s success can be attributed to several factors. First, the instructors, adjunct professors who are full-time practitioners, bring their unique perspectives and a wealth of
experience to the classroom. These attorneys, who have
practiced in the legal field for years, provide the students with hands-on training. As a result, the students
will be one step ahead of their counterparts when they
begin their practices, having already drafted numerous
documents and received valuable comments and criticisms concerning their work.
The course also exposes students to situations that they will encounter in practice. Students not only draft contracts but also get an overall
picture of what practice is really like. Before
any drafting takes place, students interview clients, negotiate with opposing parties, and research the applicable law. Then the students
draft contracts based upon their clients’ needs.
Additionally, students are taught how to be good
lawyers, regardless of the type of practice they
engage in. Professors share their mistakes so
that students may avoid those same mistakes in
the future. Very few law school courses provide
students with such practical and useful knowledge.
Guest speakers are an integral part of the
Contract Drafting course. Loan officers, real estate experts, and other attorneys frequently discuss their experiences and needs concerning the
drafting of contracts.
Finally, the various types of contracts students are required to draft provide them with an
impressive base of experience to draw upon once
they have entered the legal field. Leases, antenuptial agreements, shareholder agreements, and
employment agreements are among the docuSpring 2000

Representing Enterprises is the course in
which students put all of their learning together
to plan and draft documents for simulated transactions. In this course,students have the opportunity to take a step back and see “the big picture” by implementing the knowledge they have
gained from all of the business-related law courses
they have taken. The students plan major business deals and draft all the documents involved
in the deals. These future transactional attorneys
follow all of the steps in forming a new business, including the tax considerations, filings required, and negotiations. In addition, students
acquire experience in dealing with individuals,
both as clients and as adversaries. Corporate
mergers and acquisitions are addressed in the
course, as well as land development agreements,
buy-sell agreements, dispute resolution, and estate planning. Much like Contract Drafting, this
course is highly successful because the instructors are practitioners who are able to share their
experiences with students. Representing Enterprises is the ideal course to prepare students for
careers in transactional practice because it integrates classroom learning with real-world experience. As a result, UT College of Law students
are better-prepared than their counterparts to practice in the business world.
Success of the Business Transactions concentration can best be measured by the preparedness of new graduates. Shannon Coleman, a new
associate at the Knoxville firm of Gentry, Tipton,
Kizer & McLemore, says that the classes in the
Business Transactions concentration, especially
Contract Drafting and Representing Enterprises,
helped her tremendously when she began practicing. “My instructor pointed out issues that I
would not have thought of just coming out of law
school. I learned what to expect from the other
side.” The first week at her new job, Coleman
was involved in two transactions for which she
was asked to prepare the governing documents.
Normally, a new associate might be apprehensive about the thought of preparing documentaVolume 1 Number 2
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tion for stock redemption and purchase agreements, but due to her law school experiences,
Coleman was able to complete the assignment
much more efficiently and knowledgeably than
someone who lacked exposure to those facets of
the law.
The UT College of Law Business Concentration is innovative, and its future is exciting.
The program is teaching students how to practice transactional law, as well as how to generally be better attorneys. In addition, students
develop meaningful mentor relationships with
their instructors that will last beyond graduation.
The UT College of Law is sure to become a
national leader in the instruction of future transactional attorneys.
--Kristi Bernard

Clayton Center for Entrepreneurial Law
and the Knoxville Bar Association:
Managing For Success
Attorneys face endless commitments on a
daily basis. There is rarely the time or the energy left at the end of the day to brainstorm
about how to improve office management. Ironically, it is the efficient management of the firm
which allows the attorney to meet these commitments successfully. A lawyer who spends all of
her time dealing with office matters has no time
to practice law, which was her purpose for attending law school and opening a firm in the
first place.
The University of Tennessee College of Law
Clayton Center for Entrepreneurial Law, the Knoxville Bar Association, and the Knoxville Chapter
of the Association of Regal Administrators recently
cosponsored a CLE entitled “An Insider’s Look at
Law Office Management.” This program was
designed to assist attorneys in efficiently and effectively managing their offices. The featured
speaker and moderator of the seminar was John
Iezzi, CPA, president of the Iezzi Management
Group. Mr. Iezzi worked for eight years as an
auditor with Price Waterhouse before joining the
Richmond-based law firm of McGuire, Woods,
Battle & Boothe, LLP. Iezzi assisted the firm as it
grew from 52 lawyers in two offices to 300 lawyers in eight offices.
Volume 1 Number 2
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The program focused on three major areas
of law office management: Financial Management,
Human Resources, and Technology. The Financial Management portion of the program focused
on the budgeting and cash flow within the firm
,as well as time and billing practices and structure. It also addressed some compensation considerations.
In the afternoon the Human Resources program focused on the hiring and training of staff.
Temporary staffing and conflicts of interest issues were also discussed. Finally, in the Technology portion of the seminar, issues such as email, websites, and the use of computers to produce work products were discussed.
Several members of the Knoxville Bar Association, as well as a representative of Lockheed
Martin Energy Systems, participated in panel discussions at the seminar.
There also was a resource kit which was distributed to assist the attorneys in implementing in their own
firms some of the ideas discussed at the program.
Participants praised the seminar for both its practical nature and for the informative and lively discussions
between the panelists and participants in the seminar.
The Clayton Center for Entrepreneurial Law plans to
work in conjunction with the Knoxville Bar Association
to put on equally useful seminars in the future.
--Jeffrey Griffin

Clayton Center for Entrepreneurial Law
and the Tennessee Chapter of the
American Corporate Counsel:
A Win-Win Partnership
The University of Tennessee College of Law
Clayton Center for Entrepreneurial Law has enjoyed a successful relationship with the Tennessee Chapter of the American Corporate Counsel
Association (“ACCA”). The relationship, which
has benefited both organizations, began with the
cosponsorship of a series of Continuing Legal
Education seminars.
ACCA is composed of practicing attorneys
who are full-time employees of corporations.
Members are employed in both small and large
corporate legal departments and have a variety
of experiences ranging from recent graduates to
Spring 2000
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attorneys with over 40 years of in-house counsel
experience.

interaction with in-house counsel and this interaction is translated into a richer classroom experience for UT law students. Thus, the professors
are able to add value to the business transactions
curriculum by educating law students with information that is vital to the practice of corporate
law. Christenberry believes that the partnership
between the two organizations has been positive
for both sides and will only continue to improve
in the future as the Center and ACCA’s relationship grows.

Carl Pierce, Director of the Clayton Center,
states that the goal of the Center is to “foster
professional development of in-house counsel.”
The Center attempts to achieve its goal by focusing on three objectives: to enhance the business
transaction curriculum of the University of Tennessee College of Law, to promote scholarship
and lifetime learning for corporate attorneys in
Tennessee, and to serve the legal profession and
the public. The Center seeks to serve the niche
market of corporate attorneys by developing a
curriculum that will provide students with the
skills that corporate legal departments require
and by developing a CLE program that will provide corporate attorneys with the education necessary to foster their professional development.
Corporate attorneys spend most of their time
in two areas: developing transactions and advising the corporation. In-house counsel provide
corporations with a variety of services involving
financial transactions, litigation, lobbying, and
environmental and other compliance issues. Certainly, a major aspect of the job description is to
advise the corporation on the many rules and
regulations it must abide by.
In order to meet the needs of the corporate
attorney, the Center has teamed with the ACCA
to design an impressive CLE program tailored to
accomplish the objectives of the ACCA/Center
relationship. The program offers 3 hours on ethics and 9 hours on other areas of interest to the
corporate attorney. For example, University of
Tennessee College of Law Faculty members have
taught sessions on ethics, products liability, and
pension planning. The focus of the CLE program is to provide corporate attorneys with an
opportunity to complete CLE training in areas
that are specifically tailored to their needs.
Ed Christenberry, General Counsel for TVA
and current president of the Tennessee ACCA,
values the contribution of UT professors such as
Carl Pierce and Dean Thomas Galligan who conduct the CLEs. Christenberry states that “the CLE
attendees benefit immensely from having UT
professors conduct CLEs on current issues.” However, ACCA is not the only group that benefits
from the CLEs. UT professors benefit from their
Spring 2000

Mike Vaughn, General Counsel for Willis
Coroon in Nashville and past president of the
Tennessee ACCA chapter, concurs with
Christenberry on the success of the CLE program.
Vaughn recognizes the value of the program and
believes that attendance for the CLEs will continue to grow each year as word spreads about
the program’s existence and quality. Vaughn
stated that the attendees of the CLEs have been
pleased with the educational and networking aspects of the program. In particular, Vaughn stated
that the Ethics of Professionalism program is especially helpful because it is focused on in-house
counsel instead of attorneys practicing in law firms.
He stated that “Professor Pierce does a great job
making the information relevant and interesting
to in-house counsel.”
Vaughn sees a bright future for the Center.
Aside from continuing the successful CLE programs for corporate attorneys, he hopes that the
programs will attract more students. Vaughn believes that the Center will enable students to gain
valuable academic and practical skills. The result of this enhanced instruction will be students
who are better prepared to be effective corporate attorneys.
--Kolin B. Holladay

Professor Profile:
Gregory M. Stein, Bridging the Gap
As the saying goes, there is no substitute for
experience. Recent law school graduates encounter this problem in their initial years of practice as they often have the knowledge but lack
the specialized skills necessary to complete sophisticated business transactions. Gregory M.
Stein, Professor of Law at the University of TenVolume 1 Number 2
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nessee College of Law, recognizes a significant learning gap
for attorneys just emerging from
law school into their first years
of practice. Specifically, Professor Stein believes new attorneys could have considerable
difficulties representing real estate clients without knowledge
of the practical applications and
intricacies of real estate transactions. “Law schools
often do not teach students how to practice law.
Then the new lawyer gets to the firm – where
they are supposed to learn – and the firm is so
busy and cost conscious that they do not have a
great deal of time for training,” says Professor
Stein.
To assist these attorneys in beginning their
practice, Professor Stein and two coauthors have
teamed with BarBri and Harcourt Brace Publishers to write a book on mortgage and commercial
real estate law entitled COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE LAW
IN P RACTICE , tentatively scheduled for publication
in July 2000. Professor Stein states that the book,
aimed at junior attorneys with basic knowledge,
“will serve as a guide for people who have the
background but not the experience to conduct
real estate transactions.”
Professor Stein, a graduate of Harvard University and Columbia University Law School,
joined the University of Tennessee College of
Law faculty in 1990 after practicing law for four
years in the New York law firm of Paul, Weiss,
Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, where he specialized in commercial real estate transactions. He
currently teaches courses in land acquisition and development, land finance law, land use law, law and economics, property, and advanced property. Professor
Stein, a recipient of the Harold C. Warner Outstanding
Teacher Award, has published a number of articles on
various aspects of real estate law in law journals and
other publications across the country.
The commercial real estate law text will be one
volume in a series of practice guides coauthored
by professors and practicing attorneys. Professor Stein explains that “the idea is to have both
academic and practical perspectives in each of
the volumes.” In further describing the goals of
the series, Professor Stein says that “the books
are primarily aimed at junior attorneys who come
Volume 1 Number 2
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out of law school with basic knowledge but do
not know how to draft a contract.” This volume
and the others in the series will aid in the transition from student to practicing attorney by providing sample language and suggestions for drafting certain provisions of real estate contracts and
other instruments.
Professor Stein believes law schools recognize that there is still a rift between education
and practice, particularly in the area of business
law, which offers fewer clinical opportunities.
Currently, a student may complete many excellent business law courses and still lack the ability
to put those principles into practice. Law schools
such as the University of Tennessee, with its
Clayton Center for Entrepreneurial Law, are attempting to address this problem by establishing
business transactions centers and offering more
“practical” types of courses such as contract drafting.
According to Professor Stein, law firms traditionally taught their new attorneys the practical
aspects of real estate transactions, but with firms
becoming more thinly staffed, the junior attorneys must have other resources readily available. Professor Stein, like many other professors, tailors his classes to the problems students
will face in practice by considering various alternatives and asking how the students could have
avoided the problems presented in the case
books. He states that “our job is to teach background principles so students can understand
where their deal fits into the law.”
In addition to his focus on the transactional
aspects of real estate and mortgage law, Professor Stein has authored several articles on the Takings Clause. His most recent article, “Who Gets
the Takings Claim? Changes in Land Use Law,
Pre-enactment Owners, and Post-enactment Buyers,” will appear in the OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL this
spring. “What I’m trying to do,” Professor Stein
states, “is to keep up to date and continue writing in both areas of the law. I want to address
important constitutional issues while continuing
to help students better understand and engage in
the transactional practice of law.”
--Jamie Winkler

Spring 2000
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Book Review:
GLOBALISM IN THE 21st CENTURY
Thomas L. Friedman, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE
TREE (1999). Farrar Straus & Giroux. 394
pages. $27.50.
By R. Todd Bouldin 1
In the late 1990s, economies, cultures and
businesses around the world witnessed the birth
of one of the century’s most noteworthy developments: globalism. What does globalism have
to do with transactional law? More than it may
seem. The lesson of THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE
for law schools and law firms, wherever they
may be, is this: they can no longer afford to
bypass international law as a practice area for
specialists at prestigious firms in large cities.
Globalism has brought issues of international
trade, and thus international law, to the doorstep
of the local business and the local lawyer.
In 1999, the world celebrated the tenth anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, an event
that defined international politics of the last decade. Thomas Friedman, T HE N EW YORK T IMES
foreign affairs columnist and the author of the
award-winning FROM HERE TO BEIRUT, argues in his
latest book THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE that the
toppling of the Berlin Wall alone triggered the
ascendancy of a new and seemingly irreversible
system of globalism that now shapes the lives
and work of every world citizen. Globalism, as
Friedman deems it, is “the dominant international
system at the end of the twentieth century.”
Friedman writes that as international markets and
states cope with globalism, they will find themselves strained between the drive for prosperity
through the growth of technology and finance on
one hand (symbolized by the Lexus) and the traditional values in which local cultures remained
rooted on the other (symbolized by the Middle
Eastern olive tree). It is this tension which Friedman engages in the pages of this compelling
book.
Though the subject of globalism has received much
attention in recent journals and books, Mr. Friedman
may have written the definitive treatment on the sweeping implications of globalism for the United States and
Spring 2000
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the most remote corners of the globe. Friedman
understands the economics of world trade and
investment, but his telling of specific examples,
many of them amusing, provide the book with
its unique contribution to the globalism debate.
His use of anecdotes and travelogues like his
accountings of the Taco Bell in Qatar and the
Burger King on the Champs Elysees personalizes the globalism debate through the eyes of a
journalist so that the reader can understand the
human dynamics of international economics and
politics.
Most importantly, the author spells out the truth
of globalism: despite political setbacks and protectionist
protest, globalism is inevitable. But, not only is the
trend toward international participation inevitable, it is,
on the whole, beneficial for every nation and people.
Mr. Friedman has spoken the words that our political
leaders have been unable or unwilling to speak with
effectiveness: globalism properly regulated by the rule
of law and mediated by independent panels such as the
WTO is good for the rich and the poor, the corporation
and the laborer, the developed world and the developing one.
For Friedman, disputes about globalism are
irrelevant because the technological revolution
and the dynamics of international investments
have made globalism irreversible. Governments
like the former Soviet Union can no longer control the flow of information within their territories, now that mobile phones, satellite communications, and the Internet allow for international
communication irrespective of borders. Government officials who once could influence the economic activities of investors are unable to do so
now because markets change with lightening
speed as global investors and foreign markets
become interconnected. Capital can no longer
be contained within borders now that currency
can be moved with the click of a mouse. Nonetheless, Friedman believes that these developments do not mean the end of the nation-state or
the demise of legal structures. Nations will continue to thrive and respond to globalism with
varying degrees of effectiveness; their success
or failure depending on whether they succeed in
attracting the attention of international investors,
or as Friedman calls them, “the Electronic Herd.”
Because the Electronic Herd is no longer limited
by national borders and the Internet is global in
Volume 1 Number 2
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its reach, even the poorest of nations may provide grazing ground for the hungry Herd.

created by the sprawling Internet. This valuable
insight alone, and the narratives he offers about
the business created in developing countries by
those with access to the Web, overshadow his
otherwise limited and Americanized counsel for
poor nations and those on the brink of international economic disintegration. Mr. Friedman does
seem to forget, however, that millions of citizens
of developing countries do not have access to a
balanced diet, let alone the World Wide Web.

However, the Electronic Herd will be particular about where it grazes. To attract global
investors, nations will be forced to enact the
“Golden Straightjacket”: the privatization of state
enterprises, the lowering of tariffs, the removal
of restrictions on foreign investment and government subsidies, and the balancing of national budgets. Nevertheless, Friedman understands that a
nation’s economic action will be ineffective in
creating an atmosphere for global investment if
the legal and ethical prerequisites are not in place
to assure investors of reliable, functioning markets: potent securities market regulation, clear
shareholder rights, predictable corporate laws,
fair bankruptcy procedures that encourage investment, and the acceptance of internationally
recognized auditing and accounting standards. A
nation must follow the way of the Herd or it will
lose its way in the global marketplace. As Friedman illustrates, when France resisted the free
use of U.S. encryption technology, the head of
Intel’s European marketing department used a
razor blade to physically remove France from his
map of the world. Thus, nations may choose the
policies they desire, but they will be subject to
the discipline of markets.
Though Friedman states that economies will
respond to globalism in varying degrees, he fails
to see that his approach allows for little diversity
in such responses and fails to offer little more
than abstract proposals and vague hopes to the
developing world. Instead of recognizing that
several forms of government have given rise to
flourishing economies, Mr. Friedman’s “Golden
Straightjacket” seems to reflect the fiscal policies
and legal structure of the United States. The
author also offers few suggestions to the governments of developing countries for protecting their
economies from the harsh effects of international
investment. For example, his prescription for
International Monetary Fund and World Bank reforms are formulaic and fall short of real proposals to protect poor nations. Though Mr. Friedman limits his foray into policy territory, he succeeds on a grand scale in his analysis of the most
significant hope for the reform and economic
success of the developing world: the transparency and interconnectedness of markets and states
Volume 1 Number 2

But here in America, even the smallest of Tennessee and American businesses now export goods abroad,
many of them selling their wares over the Internet.
Therefore, Tennessee attorneys must begin to inform
themselves of international law. Otherwise, many clients may risk criminal or civil liability because they conduct their business without the assistance of counsel.
Furthermore, some clients may benefit from attorneys
who could point them to export opportunities.
Firms whose expertise includes international trade
law will possess a valuable business development tool
in the 21st century global business environment. Clients
may look to larger and more expensive firms in Washington, D.C., or New York for counsel if a local firm is
unaware of international trade law. While it heretofore
has been acceptable to confine one’s expertise to domestic law, Friedman’s book opens up the brave new
world where only the internationally informed business,
or law firm, will survive in the coming age.
THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE is clear that
globalism will leave no stone unturned, no client
unaffected. For this reason, the book is an invaluable and accessible read for any lawyer who
wants to serve transactional clients comprehensively and ethically in the age of the Internet and
globally-connected economies. Friedman vividly communicates his firm, if not elated, belief
that the Electronic Herd is coming to a client
near you, and only lawyers with global perspectives will help create the conditions that will make
the Herd want to stay.
1

R. Todd Bouldin is a third year law student at the University of Tennessee.
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Book Review:
A NEW GUIDE TO COMMERCE
IN THE 21st CENTURY
Steffano Korper & Juanita Ellis, THE E-COMMERCE
BOOK: BUILDING THE E-EMPIRE (2000). London:
Academic Press. 284 pages. $39.95.
By Trevor Smith 1
Internet commerce is rapidly becoming a
common element of the business world. Although
specific estimates vary, experts agree that e-commerce will constitute several hundred billion dollars within 5 years, and will become a major
element of the U.S. and global economies. This
new online business world creates both an opportunity and a challenge to the legal profession.
Within a very short time, concrete knowledge of
Internet business practices will be a necessity
for all successful business attorneys. In T HE EC OMMERCE BOOK , the authors explain how to establish and maintain an online business presence.
This work, although not legal in nature, can be a
useful resource for the business attorney seeking
to understand the fundamentals behind e-commerce.
Korper and Ellis assert that sales of basic
consumer goods, which is currently the prime
element of Internet commerce, is only the beginning of the e-commerce future. They argue
that all businesses, regardless of products sold or
markets reached, will be changed by, and forced
to adapt to, online commercial practices. According to Korper and Ellis, forty percent of all
business to business transactions will be online
within seven years. They assert that any company which resists the move into e-commerce
will not survive long into the next century. The
authors correctly point out that the Internet is
littered with new companies, many with market
values of millions and even billions of dollars,
that are challenging those corporations which have
failed to embrace the new electronic medium.

online marketing and the list of resources which
can be used to generate customers. The authors
also discuss business challenges such as globalization and language barriers, hardware and software solutions, online transactions, and online
security. Each of these topics is presented clearly,
and all necessary elements of online business
are discussed.
Lacking in this work is help for the Internet newcomer. The authors assume that the reader already has
access to the Internet and a working knowledge of
Internet use. Because a web site is the basic element of
all Internet business, the authors do not explain to the
reader how to set up a presence on the World Wide
Web, nor do they discuss other Internet basics such as
finding a service provider or choosing software. Such
an obvious oversight is understandable, however, given
the nature of this book. A simple website can be used
to inform the consumer and place the consumer in contact with a company. This work explains how to convert
such an existing Internet presence into a vehicle for
business transactions. This work also does not discuss
the unique legal issues which surround the growth of ecommerce. Such issues include compliance with international laws, liability, jurisdiction, and taxes. In the near
future such issues will almost certainly re-define business law in many ways.
The authors correctly assert that the issues
surrounding Internet business are quite different
from those of bricks and mortar companies. For
today’s business lawyer, lack of such knowledge
will soon prove to be more than a hindrance; it
could be a career-threatening liability. On the
other hand, a clear understanding of Internet commerce will provide tremendous opportunities for
those who seek it.
Trevor Smith is the founder and CEO of Smith Online
Entertainment, Inc., which operates HistoryDaily.com and
FirstShopping.com.
1

This work discusses every element of building and maintaining a new online business, and
creating an online business presence for existing
companies. Perhaps one of the most useful elements of this work is the in-depth discussion of
Spring 2000
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SYNOPSES
WILLS AND T RUSTS
Battles v. First Union National Bank, No.
01A01-9809-CH-00497, 1999 WL 675126 (Tenn.
Ct. App. Sept. 1, 1999)
In Battles v. First Union National Bank, two
heirs under a contested “will” sued a notary public, the notary’s bonding company, and a bank
for failing to correct their father’s belief that the
document he signed constituted a validly executed
will. The Court of Appeals of Tennessee held
that the notary and the bank’s employees are not
responsible for correcting a testator who mistakenly believes that notarization of his signature in
the absence of witnesses validated his will.
In the instant case, Cleon H. Cooke, Jr., traveled to First Union National Bank in
Hendersonville, Tennessee, on November 28,
1995 to execute his will. It is uncontroverted
that he intended to execute a preprinted will
previously completed by the testator by filling in
the blanks holographically. Upon his arrival at
First Union, one of Cooke’s daughters entered
the bank to find an individual who would notarize his “will.” Cooke waited in his car until his
daughter returned with Beverly Pitt, a customer
service representative. Pitt watched Cooke sign
the document, entitled “Last Will and Testament.”
She then took the document into the bank and
found two bank employees to attest to Cooke’s
“Last Will and Testament.” 1 The witnesses to
Cooke’s will were bank employees. Neither Pitt
nor the bank’s employees advised Cooke that
the notarized and “witnessed” document failed
to meet the due execution requirements mandated by the Wills Act. See Tenn. Code Ann. §
32-1-104. 2
The “testamentary” document signed and
notarized in 1995 purported to convey his business, C & S Cleaners of Hendersonville, to his
living children. Under this instrument, Cooke
also designated the residue of his estate to benefit his widow, Angelina Q. Cooke. But under
his formally executed and valid 1976 will, the
testator bequeathed all of his real and personal
property to his widow. When the decedent’s daughters
probated the 1995 document, their mother filed a will
contest alleging that the 1995 “will” was impropVolume 1 Number 2

erly executed and void.
and Leslie Cooke initiated
leging negligent execution
the notary, the bank, and
company.

In response, Allison
the instant action alof decedent’s will by
the notary’s bonding

Curiously, of the decedent’s seven children, only
Allison and Leslie attempted to hold the defendant liable for negligent execution of the 1995 “will.” In their
complaint, the Cooke sisters neglected to explain whether
the probate court had actually invalidated the 1995 document pursuant to Angelina Cooke’s will contest. Nevertheless, the Battles court pressed on to answer the issues presented on appeal.
With regard to the claim of negligent execution asserted against the notary, the Battles
court held that Pitt acted competently. Adopting
a California precedent, the court ruled that a notary does not have an obligation to “give advice
about the legal effects of papers to which she
witnesses a signature.” Battles, 1999 WL 675126
at *2 (citing Vanderhoof v. Prudential Savings and
Loan Ass’n., 48 Cal.App. 3d 507, 520, 120 Cal.
Reptr. 207 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975). The Battles court
buttressed Tennessee’s own case law which required only ordinary care because the notary “is
not an ensurer of the truth of [her] recitals.” Figures v. Fly, 193 S.W.2d 117 (Tenn. 1917). 3
The court in Battles next determined
whether the witnesses to Cooke’s 1995 “will”
violated a duty of care to the testator’s daughters.
In answering this point of law, 4 the court emphasized that the plaintiff could not claim a vested
interest in the decedent’s will even if it had been
validly executed. The basis for the court’s conclusion rested on the well settled notion that “a
beneficiary under the will has no property rights
in the testator’s property until the testator’s death.”
Dought v. Hammond, 341 S.W.2d 713, 716
(Tenn. 1960). The court also indicated that the
“witness immunity shield” might provide the witnesses to the 1995 “will” with additional protection from tort immunity for false testimony.
Buckner v. Carlton, 623 S.W.2d 102 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1981). Under Buckner’s immunity shield,
witnesses receive qualified immunity from testimony taken in open court even when their statements are false or malicious.
Spring 2000
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In denying the plaintiff’s appeal, the court
protected witnesses because the court found that
they play no part in drafting testamentary instruments. The court distinguished witnesses from
those who draft wills that later fail for inadequate
due execution. See Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d
16 (Cal. 1958). But in Battles, the court concluded that the plaintiff’s interest in receiving a
share of her father’s estate comprised a mere
expectancy. Thus, like notaries, witnesses are
not subject to a duty requiring them to aid putative beneficiaries whose hope for inheritance rests
upon unrealized hope. Accordingly, the court
held that the bank did not have a duty to train its
employees on the due execution of testamentary
instruments because witnesses do not have a duty
to the testator.
The Battles court established that notaries
and witnesses shall bear no tort liability for their
involvement in the execution of a will unless
they drafted the will. However, the court also
indicated that even a witness to an invalidly executed will might defend her actions under
Buckner’s ‘qualified witness’ exception allowing
false or malicious statements in open court. Thus,
Battles teaches that banks, law firms, and even
notary bonding companies in Tennessee need
not train their employees in the technicalities of
proper testamentary execution under the Wills
Act.
--Justin R. Martin
1. It is not entirely clear what the witnesses to Cooke’s
“will” actually signed. It appears that they signed the
will’s pre-printed attestation clause and self-proving
affidavit. Cooke’s will would not conform to the requirements of valid execution of Tennessee’s Wills Act if the
witnesses signed the affidavit but neglected to sign the
will itself.
2. The plaintiff attributed the 1995 document’s purported
invalidity arose from negligent notarization and witnessing
of her father’s “will.” The testator’s daughters further
alleged that the witnesses committed perjury in signing a
false affidavit and that the notary negligently failed to
inform the decedent that these procedures did not meet
the legal requirements of a valid will execution.
3. The Battles court incorporated this position on the
notary’s innocence, holding that “failure to volunteer
information as to the legal effect of the manner of its
attestation is not actionable for the reason that she not
only had no duty in this respect, but for her to have done
so would have been an illegal act. 1999 WL 675126 at *2;
120 Cal.Rptr at 209.
4. The existence or nonexistence of a duty is a question of
law for the court. Glenn v. Conner, 533 S.W.2d 297 (Tenn.
1976).

Spring 2000

Estate of J.P. Walker v. Tenn. Dept. of Revenue, C/A No. 03A01-9808-PB-00250, 1999
Tenn.App.LEXIS 447 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 13,
1999)
Upon death, a decedent’s estate is often subjected to federal and state taxes. The issue presented in Estate of J.P. Walker is whether federal
estate and income taxes have priority over state
inheritance taxes when the estate is insolvent.
The trial court found the Federal Insolvency Statute applicable in this case, and the court granted
priority to the federal tax claim. The Tennessee
Department of Revenue appealed the decision.
J.P. Walker died testate in 1991; consequently, his estate was assessed federal estate
and income taxes. By 1995, the Estate’s aggregate federal tax liability was over four million
dollars. The Tennessee Department of Revenue’s
inheritance tax claims totaled over a half a million dollars. In late 1996, the estate filed a notice of insolvency because it lacked sufficient
funds to pay both tax claims in full.
The United States claimed that it was entitled to priority in payment of the tax debts,
relying on the Federal Insolvency Statute, 31
U.S.C.A. § 3713. That statute provides, in pertinent part, that “A claim of the United States shall
be paid first when . . . the estate of a deceased
debtor . . . is not enough to pay all debts of the
debtor . . . .” 31 U.S.C.A. § 3713 (a)(1)(B).
The Tennessee Department of Revenue
claimed that the Federal Insolvency Statute was
inapplicable to this case because the state inheritance tax claim is not a “debt of the debtor”
since it arose after the death of Mr. Walker. Tennessee claimed that its tax lien arose at the same
time as the federal tax lien—upon Mr. Walker’s
death. Additionally, the Department of Revenue
argued that its competing tax claim should share
“pro rata” in the distribution.
The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that in cases of insolvency § 3713
confers an absolute priority to federal tax claims
over state claims, allowing no exceptions. See
United States v. Vermont, 377 U.S. 351, 84 S.Ct.
1267, 12 L.Ed.2d 370 (1964). In various cases,
the Supreme Court observed that § 3713 should
be construed liberally to favor priority of federal
claims. United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 77, 96
Volume 1 Number 2
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S.Ct. 310, 46 L.Ed.2d 219 (1975); United States v.
Key, 397 U.S. 322, 90 S.Ct. 310, 46 L.Ed.2d 219
(1975). A public policy reasoning, having sufficient revenue to provide for the public welfare
and protection of the public fiscal situation, has
been employed by the Supreme Court to justify
the liberal construction of § 3713.
The Tennessee Court of Appeals held the
Federal Insolvency Statute applicable in this case
as well. The state inheritance debts are “debts
of the debtor” within the meaning of § 3713.
Although the Department of Revenue argued that
such taxes are debts of the estate (not the debtor),
the Court of Appeals held that the liberal construction of § 3713 includes state inheritance taxes
as “debts of the debtor.” Decisions in other jurisdictions are consistent with the Tennessee Court
of Appeals determination.
This decision will primarily effect Tennessee tax lawyers and estate planners. Specifically, there should be no doubt when advising
clients whether to pay federal tax debts or state
tax debts first. Clearly, clients should be advised
to satisfy all federal tax estate claims before state
claims.
--South Lewis

PROPERTY
Graham v. Edmundson, 1999 WL 476466
(Tenn. Ct. App. July 12, 1999)
For years, lawyers who wanted to place restrictive covenants on property advised their clients to place such restrictions on title to the land
when the client owned it as a whole. Lawyers in
Tennessee have generally cited Southern Advertising Co. v. Sherman , 308 S.W.2d 491 (Tenn.
1957) and East Sevier County Util. Dist. v. Wachovia
Bank & Trust Co., 570 S.W.2d 850 (Tenn. 1978).
In Sherman, The Tennessee Supreme Court held
that restrictive covenants would be given effect
to the property only as it existed at the time of
the covenant. In Graham, the Tennessee Court
of Appeals reaffirmed the decision not to give
restrictive covenants retroactive effect.
In March 1978, Fitts and Johnson Development Company acquired a tract of land that eventually became Bluff Road Acres. On April 7,
1978, two of those tracts were sold to Hasty Construction Company. Then, on September 13, 1978,
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Fitts and Johnson executed and properly recorded
restrictive covenants that purported to cover the
entire property. The appropriate parts of the
restrictions stated that 1) no trailer homes are to
be erected upon the property; and 2) no commercial activities are permitted in the restricted
area. The record also states that Hasty Construction never agreed to the restrictions on the two
lots it owned. Two months after the restrictions
were recorded, Hasty sold part of the land in
question to the Thomases, who in October 1981
sold the property to the Edmundsons. In 1991,
the property was quitclaimed to Mrs. Edmundson
after she and her husband divorced. Edmundson
subsequently erected a mobile home, expanded
a barn, held rodeos, and opened a beauty parlor.
Twenty-one homeowners then filed suit asserting violations of the restrictive covenants and
sought injunctive relief.
The trial court granted summary judgment
for the defendant stating that “a covenant running with the land must be confined to the property as it existed at the time of the covenant….”
In addition, the fact that the defendant had knowledge of the restrictions and even felt bound by
them for some time was not pertinent. The grant
of summary judgment decreed that there were
no issues of material fact and only one conclusion could be drawn from the facts. The plaintiffs appealed, and in a de novo review, the court
of appeals addressed the pertinent question. The
Court dealt with the power of a developer to
bind property it does not own by filing a subdivision plat with restrictive covenants.
Quoting Sherman, the court concluded that restrictive covenants will only be valid to the property as it
existed at the time of the covenant. The fact that Fitts
and Johnson placed the restrictions on the land several
months after they sold the land to Hasty (and Hasty
never agreed to the restrictions) meant that the restrictive covenants never attached to the property in question. The court then, quoting East Sevier County, restated
that no covenants should be given general retroactive
effect.
This decision reaffirms Tennessee law stating that
if a developer (or any other party) wants to bind an
entire piece of land, it must place the restrictive covenants on the land while it owns the entire tract. The
possibility of placing a retroactive covenant on another’s
land without the acquiescence of the other party is ficSpring 2000

16

Transactions TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

tion. Developers must remember to place restrictive covenants on land before any piece is
sold. The decision in Graham encourages transactional attorneys to identify the needs and desires of their clients and to act upon those needs
and desires before any part of the property is
sold.

Thereafter, the Hathaways filed a complaint
against First Family in the Chancery Court for
Davidson County, on behalf of themselves and
“others similarly situated,” alleging that the method
used by First Family to calculate the four percent
service charge had resulted in a charge in excess
of the maximum permitted under Tenn. Code
Ann. § 45-5-403(1)(A) (Supp. 1998). As a result,
the plaintiffs sought “the full array of remedies
provided in T.C.A. § 47-14-117 (1995).” Their
complaint also alleged that the excessive service
charge constituted fraud, negligence, misrepresentation, unjust enrichment, and violated the
Federal Truth in Lending Act, the Federal Real
Estate Settlement Procedures Act, and the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act.

--Neil Brunetz
Hathaway v. First Family Fin. Servs., Inc. ,
1999 WL 668786 (Tenn. Aug. 30, 1999)
Prior to 1978, Article 11, Section 7 of the
Tennessee Constitution provided a ten percent
ceiling on conventional interest rates. Such a
ceiling restricted the availability of credit during
periods of inflation. In 1978, the General Assembly addressed this problem with the passage
of a constitutional amendment and, additionally,
with a package of reform legislation enacted in
1979. Part of this reform legislation was the
Industrial Loan and Thrift Companies Act (Loan
and Thrift Act) which governed the conduct of
industrial loan and thrift companies. In Hathaway,
the Tennessee Supreme Court was asked to decide the formula for calculating a service charge
in connection with a refinancing transaction. In
addition, the Court was asked to decide the scope
of a borrower’s remedies for violation of limitations on loan charges imposed by the Loan and
Thrift Act.
Joe and Willie Hathaway obtained a loan
from First Family Financial Services, Inc. (First
Family), the predecessor-in-interest. This loan
was secured by a lien on their home. In September 1995 the Hathaways refinanced their loan
with First Family. The Hathaways executed, in
exchange for the second loan, a promissory note
that included the principal amount of the second
loan plus precomputed interest thereon over the
life of the second loan. The Hathaways used
proceeds from the second loan to completely
retire the first loan. First Family imposed a service charge on the second loan, which was calculated by subtracting the amount that was used
to retire the initial loan balance from the total
amount of the refinancing loan and assessing a
four percent service charge on the remaining
balance.
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After First Family removed the case to the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, First Family filed a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim. First Family
asserted that the service charges at issue were
legal pursuant to the Loan and Thrift Act and that
this Act provided the Hathaways with their exclusive remedy. As a result of this motion to
dismiss, the district judge entered an order certifying to the Tennessee Supreme Court the two
questions previously stated, and signifying that
these questions were dispositive of First Family’s
motion to dismiss. The Tennessee Supreme Court
accepted certification of these questions.
With respect to the first question, the dispute centered around the determination of the
amount that is to be subtracted from the “total
amount of the loan” which is “that portion of a
loan used to pay any existing loan or part thereof
owing by the same borrower.” The Hathaways
argued that the amount used to pay off their first
loan should include the outstanding principal plus
any interest on the original loan that would have
accrued after the date of refinancing, even though
the interest never accrued because the original
loan was retired by the refinancing loan. In this
manner, the amount on which First Family could
have imposed a service charge would have been
substantially reduced. The Court rejected the
Hathaways interpretation because no portion of
the refinancing loan was actually used to pay
nonexistent interest. As such, the Court determined that the amount upon which the four percent loan service charge can be imposed is deVolume 1 Number 2
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termined by subtracting from the refinancing loan
the amount of the original loan that is outstanding as of the date of the refinancing. This latter
amount does not include interest on the original
loan that has not and will not accrue as a result of
the refinancing transaction.
On the second question, the Court very succinctly
decided that the remedies prescribed by Tenn. Code
Ann. §§ 47-14-101, et seq. are the exclusive remedies of
borrowers with respect to a violation of the limitations
on loan and interest charges that are imposed by
the Loan and Thrift Act. In reaching this decision, the Court relied upon Hodges v. S.C. Toof &
Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 899 (Tenn. 1992), in which
the Court stated that if a statute creates a new
right and prescribes a remedy for its enforcement, then the prescribed remedy is exclusive.
This decision clarifies the amount on which
an Industrial Loan and Thrift Company may impose a service charge. However, on the issue of
remedies under the Loan and Thrift Act, the Court
held that the only remedies open to borrowers
are exclusive with respect to interest and loan
charges under the Loan and Thrift Act. This does
not mean that Industrial Loan and Thrift Companies are not under any circumstances subject to
the provisions of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, but the Court specifically declined to
adopt such a broad exemption. As such, each
case must be examined on its own facts because
it is unclear to what extent an Industrial Loan and
Thrift Company could be held subject to the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act on matters unrelated to loan and interest charges.
--John R. LaBar
Nesmith v. Alsup, 1999 WL 557620 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Aug. 2, 1999)
When documents are not written clearly, attorneys
and clients must think of creative arguments to produce
the result that the original documents intended. The
case of Nesmith v. Alsup did this when confusing language in a will led a client to make an argument of
adverse possession against another co-tenant. To successfully raise this argument, the Nesmith court states
that the ejection of a tenant from the property
must be clear.
In his Last Will and Testament, John Alsup
named his wife, Blanche Alsup, as trustee in
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charge of providing for their son’s education. If
necessary, the trustee was given the right to sell
the family farm to finance the education of John
Alsup II, with the remainder to be equally divided between Blanche, John Alsup II, and Betty,
Blanche’s daughter. After the testator’s death,
John Alsup II (“John”), was able to attend college without selling the farm. While John was in
college, his mother moved to Georgia to live
with Betty, leaving John to attend to the maintenance and upkeep of the family farm. During
this time, John exercised sole control over the
property. John rented the property, took rents,
and paid the property taxes. In addition, John
negoiated with the City of Murfreesboro for an
easement and he dealt with a number of parties
interested in purchasing the property.
Following the death of Blanche, Betty
brought suit claiming that language in Blanche’s
will granting “to my two children, Betty Alsup
Mavity Nesmith and John A. Alsup II, in fee simple,
share and share alike” created in her an undivided one-half interest in the farm. John challenged Betty’s claim, and through litigation, the
trial court determined that John Alsup’s will created a tenancy in common between John, Betty,
and Blanche. Following the death of Blanche,
the trial court held that John and Betty held an
undivided one-half interest in the farm.
On appeal, John raised a number of issues,
including that of adverse possession.
A claim of adverse possession by one cotenant against another co-tenant is inherently complicated. In order to sustain a claim of adverse
possession in Tennessee, a party must maintain
possession for at least seven years, and the possession must be open, actual, continuous, exclusive, adverse, and notorious. It is theoretically
impossible, therefore, for a co-tenant to adversely
possess against another co-tenant in that, by definition, possession by one of the co-tenants is
equated with possession by all of the co-tenants.
In addition, the Court of Appeals notes that, since
each co-tenant retains the right to enter the property, possession of the property by one of the
co-tenants is generally not considered adverse to
the claim of the other co-tenants.
Acknowledging the need for a possibility of
adverse possession as against co-tenants, Tennessee courts recognize an exception to the usual
Spring 2000
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requirements for adverse possession in the event
that one of the co-tenants ousts the other cotenants. Short of physical removal from the property, an ouster, as defined by the court, involves
“some act that makes it clear to [the] co-tenant
that she is being excluded from ownership.” Previous opinions have held that constructive notice
will not constitute an ouster. See Drewery v.
Nelms, 177 S.W. 946, 948 (1915) (holding that
“[t]he mere silent, sole occupation by one of the
entire property, though he be claiming the whole
estate, and appropriating the whole rents, without an accounting to or claim by others, without
notice of his co-tenant that his possession is adverse, and unaccompanied by some act which
can amount to an exclusion and ouster of the cotenant, cannot be construed into an adverse possession”). From previous opinions and the literal
reading adopted by the court, it seems clear that
in order for a co-tenant to adversely possess property against other co-tenants, there must be a
positive act on the part of the possessor that
unequivocally informs the other co-tenants that
they are excluded from the property.

appeals unless the client has issued some affirmative act in effort to inform the co-tenant.
--Thomas Dykstra
Bullard v. Scott, 1999 WL 486818 (Tenn. Ct.
App. July 13, 1999)
Transactional attorneys in commercial real
estate business have long used the tenancy in
common as a way of granting a single piece of
property to multiple parties. A tenancy in common permits co-tenants to convey their share of
the property to another without risking the loss
of the advantages a tenancy in common provides.
Very few restrictions are placed upon a cotenant’s right to convey his or her share of the
property to another. Bullard v. Scott, 1999 WL
486818 (Tenn. Ct. App.), creates a new and unexpected restriction upon that right.

In this case, the court held that Alsup’s actions and representations as sole owner of the
farm did not constitute an ouster. The fact that
John did not offer an accounting of the income
of the property to either his mother or sister did
not constitute what the court views as actual notice of exclusion from the property. In addition,
the fact that John represented himself as the sole,
exclusive owner to the City of Murfreesboro,
potential buyers, as well as tenants on the property did not afford Betty the degree of notice
required by the court. The Court of Appeals
held against John despite Betty’s knowledge that
John was representing himself as sole owner of
the property and that her name was not on any
of the documents involved in these representations.

The controversy in Bullard surrounds a lot
in the Thatcher Shore Acres Subdivision. Thatcher
Shore Acres is a 40-lot subdivision located adjacent to a lake. The lot in question was conveyed to 38 of the 39 property owners of
Thatcher Shore Acres as tenants in common so
that each property owner in the subdivision would
have water access. As a result of the conveyance, each grantee owned a 1/39 th interest in the
lot. The Scotts obtained one of these 1/39 th interests. In an effort to provide the property owners of two adjacent subdivisions with lake access, the Scotts conveyed a 1/7800 th interest in
their 1/39 th interest to the property owners of
these two adjacent subdivisions. (Their deed did
not prohibit such a conveyance.) By the conveyance, the water access lot in the Thatcher
Shore Acres Subdivision was subject to the additional use of over 40 new property owners.
Bullard and the other property owners of the
Thatcher Shore Acres Subdivision sued to invalidate the conveyance.

The implication of this case for transactional
attorneys is clear. If a client wishes to posses
adversely against a co-tenant, the client must, by
a clear, unmistakable act inform the co-tenant of
the client’s intentions to possess adversely. Mere
constructive knowledge, or even actual knowledge on the part of the co-tenant, will not satisfy
the strict requirement articulated by the court of

In Tennessee, co-tenants of a piece of property held by a tenancy in common enjoy the
right to possess and use the entire piece of property. However, each co-tenant stands in a confidential relationship to the other co-tenants. The
same duties are imposed upon them as though
“a joint trust was created by contract between
them.” Thus, each co-tenant must “put forth their
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best exertions to protect the common interest”
and cannot assume a “hostile attitude” toward the
rest of the co-tenants. Each co-tenant also has a
right to convey his share of the property to another. The new owner of the interest in the
property enjoys the same right to possess and
use the entire piece of property as the original
owner.

whether interpreted broadly or narrowly, transactional lawyers would serve their clients well
by being aware of Bullard and its possible implications.

In Bullard, the court recognized that a cotenant has a right to convey his or her interest in
a piece of property. The court also recognized
that the Scotts had lawfully conveyed their interest in the property. The court stated, however,
that a lawful conveyance may have such adverse
effects upon the other co-tenants’ known use of
the property that it can only be considered as “a
‘hostile’ act against the co-tenancy.” The court
held that “under the unique circumstances of this
case,” the Scotts’ conveyance constituted an “assumption of a hostile attitude.” Because the number of potential users of the property was increased by over 40, the conveyance was a violation of the Scotts’ duty “to put forth his or her
best interest of the co-tenancy.” Thus, the court
invalidated the conveyance.

Chattanooga Associates, Limited Partnership v. Cherokee Warehouses, Inc. , No.
03A01-9901-CH-00021, 1999 WL 907653 (Tenn.
Ct. App. Oct. 18, 1999)

How should lawyers interpret Bullard? Interpreted broadly, the decision in Bullard would
seem to be a significant change in property law.
Normally, the lawful conveyance of an interest
in a piece of property by a co-tenant would not
be considered an assumption of a hostile attitude
toward the other co-tenants. The difficulty in
interpreting Bullard so broadly is the uncertainty
of where one would draw the line. Can a conveyance be considered hostile for other reasons?
For example, what if a co-tenant conveys his or
her entire interest to a person that he or she
knew was planning to make an improper use of
the property. Could the other co-tenants win a
suit to invalidate the conveyance based upon the
Bullard decision? Because the court qualified its
holding by stating “under the unique circumstances of this case,” the more likely approach is
to interpret Bullard narrowly. But even if given
a narrow interpretation, Bullard presents problems. For example, how does a co-tenant determine, before the transaction occurs, the allowable number of parties to which he may convey
his interest? Bullard does not provide much guidance to lawyers making this determination. Thus,
Volume 1 Number 2

--Chris Trump

CONTRACTS

This case examines the scope of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in
certain provisions of a lease agreement. It also
provides a definition of the contract terms “maintenance” and “repairs.” Chattanooga Associates,
Limited Partnership (“Plaintiff”) leased a warehouse to Cherokee Warehouses, Inc. (“Defendant”). The lease agreement provided Defendant would be responsible for paying its proportionate share of any maintenance or repairs on
the building or land surrounding the building. In
1994, Plaintiff performed what it believed to be
necessary construction projects on the parking
lot of the storage warehouse and charged Defendant its proportionate share of the costs. When
Defendant refused to pay the bill within the time
specified in the lease terms, Plaintiff sued Defendant in the Chancery Court of Hamilton County
and was awarded costs of construction on the
parking lot of the warehouse property, plus a 15
percent late charge pursuant to a provision in
the lease, and attorney’s fees. Defendant appealed the chancellor’s decision to the Tennessee Court of Appeals.
On appeal, Defendant argued that the chancellor erred in refusing to bar recovery because
Plaintiff breached the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. More specifically, Defendant contended that Plaintiff had a duty to disclose to Defendant any plans to perform construction work on the property and that those
plans were not disclosed. The court of appeals
discussed the duty of good faith analyzed in
Wallace v. National Bank of Commerce, 938 S.W.
2d 684 (Tenn. 1997), which held that the common law duty of good faith does not extend beyond the agreed upon terms in a contract. After
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discussing Wallace the court stated that in order
for Defendant “to prevail on this issue, it must
prove that the Plaintiff’s actions were not a performance of the contract according to its terms.
This is particularly true in this case where the
parties to the contract are two experienced commercial entities.” Chattanooga Associates, Limited Partnership v. Cherokee Warehouses, Inc., No.
03A01-9901-CH-00021, 1999 WL 907653, at *6
(Oct. 18, 1999 Tenn. Ct. App.). The terms of the
lease agreement did not require any prior notice
before beginning maintenance or repairs. The
court stated: “The contract gave the Plaintiff the
option to elect to perform ‘any maintenance or
repairs . . .’ as it saw fit. The contract placed no
requirement on the Plaintiff to notify the Defendant before undertaking any such ‘maintenance
or repairs.’” Id. at *7. The court then reasoned
that “[i]f Defendant wished such a requirement
be placed on Plaintiff, it could have negotiated
that issue with the Plaintiff and insisted that such
a provision be included in the contract. No such
provision requiring notice was included.” Id.
Therefore, the court of appeals found that Plaintiff did not breach an implied duty of good faith
and fair dealing and that the chancellor did not
err in refusing to bar recovery on such basis. Id.
at *7.
Although the court of appeals found in favor of
Plaintiff on this issue, the case was reversed and remanded in order to determine what parts of the construction constituted “maintenance or repairs” under the
lease agreement. The court indicated that some of the
purported repairs may have actually been capital improvements, for which Defendant would not be financially responsible. The court stated that it did not have
enough evidence to decide which expenses of the construction were for “maintenance or repairs.” However,
the court did provide the chancellor with some
guidance, defining expenses as “necessary to
keep the premises in as good as a condition as
they were in when the lease was entered into by
the parties.” Id.
In light of their holding, the court of appeals found that the chancellor’s award of the
late fee was in error. Id. at *9. Although the
lease agreement provided that Plaintiff could
charge Defendant a 15percent late fee, the court
reasoned that some of the expenses charged were
not actually repairs under the lease. Id. The
Spring 2000

Transactions TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW
In re Estate of Harold Jenkins, No. 01-A-019707-CH-00348, 1998 Tenn. App. Lexis 375
(Tenn. Ct. App. June 12, 1998)
It is well established in Tennessee that an oral
contract is enforceable under most circumstances. Difficulties arise, however, when one of the parties to the
contract dies before fulfilling his part of the bargain.
Throw in a country music superstar, a bitter bus driver,
not to mention a large estate, and a simple contracts
case takes on a life of its own. Such was the case of In re
Estate of Harold Jenkins.
In In re Estate of Harold Jenkins, Billy Parks
was employed as a driver, valet, and general
handyman by Harold Jenkins, a/k/a Conway
Twitty. Joining the entourage in 1972, Parks was
employed by the country music sensation until
Twitty’s death in 1993. Throughout his 21 years
of service with Twitty, Parks received a regular
salary, medical benefits, and a pension.
Following Twitty’s death, Parks filed a claim
against the estate, seeking enforcement of a binding oral contract to pay a $20,000 bonus to Parks
after twenty years with his employer. Specifically, Parks claimed that Twitty had promised to
pay a $20,000 bonus to members of his crew
that stayed with him twenty years, that Twitty
had made bonus payments to other employees,
and that Parks was entitled to the bonus in 1992.
The probate court denied the claim, holding that
Twitty’s promise to “take care of Billy Parks”
was too vague and uncertain to be legally enforceable. On appeal, the appellate court reversed and remanded for a hearing and disposition. On remand, Parks’ claim was denied, indicating that “there was absolutely no bonus . . .
no contract. There was no offer, acceptance, consideration.”
On appeal, Parks argued that he was entitled to the
$20,000 bonus based on a unilateral contract offer that
may be accepted by performance. Citing Hutchinson v.
Dobson-Bainbridge Realty Co., 31 Tenn. App. 490, 217 S.W.2d
6 (Tenn. App. 1946), the court noted that while “a binding contract is not formed until acceptance, the promisor may lose the power to withdraw the promise where
the promisee has partly performed in reliance on the
promise.” Ultimately, the case of Billy Parks lacked a
promise. Nowhere was it established that Twitty had
said, implied, or otherwise promised Mr. Parks that “if
you work for me for twenty years, I will pay you $20,000.”
Volume 1 Number 2
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Rather, the most the court could conclude was
that “at one point,” Twitty intended to pay his
crew a $20,000 bonus. Nevertheless, a mere intention “to do something on the happening of a
particular event does not amount to an offer that
can be accepted by the other party.” As a result, the court held that Parks failed to establish
his claim for the bonus.
As the decision in Estate of Jenkins indicates, no matter how good the relationship between the employee and employer, the terms
and conditions of a bonus should always be in
writing. This not only protects the employee, but
the employer and the employer’s estate from false
claims. Just as employment can be terminated at
will, so can a promise to “take care of” an employee. Where an employer intends to provide a
system of bonuses for employees, it is vital to
provide written documentation of this program,
or in the alternative, establish a standard practice
and timeline for granting bonuses. While this will
not entirely preclude the frivolous litigation surrounding the administration of a celebrity’s estate, it is a step in the right direction.
--Heather Flory

ANTI-TRUST
Jo Ann Forman, Inc., v. National Council On
Compensation Insurance, Inc. , No. 01-A-019805-CH-00260, 1999 WL 767799 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Sept. 29, 1999)
Business contracts may contain clauses which
regulate or set the prices respecting goods and/
or services of one or both of the parties. Whether
these business arrangements operate in restraint
of trade, and are hence unlawful, is governed by
state and federal antitrust legislation. Tennessee’s
state antitrust statutes, the Tennessee Trade Practices Act, govern intrastate commerce agreements:
“[a]ll arrangements, contracts, agreements, trusts
or combination between persons or corporations
made with a view to lessen, or which tend to
lessen, full and free competition [respecting sale
or importation of articles in the marketplace, and
those] designed, or which tend to advance, reduce, or control the price or the cost to the producer or consumer of any such product or article, are declared to be against public policy,
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unlawful and void.” Tenn Code Ann. §47-25-101
(1995). The statutory language has remained
unchanged since 1903. Cases turn entirely on
whether or not the pricing arrangements in dispute concern a “product or article” within the
meaning of the statute, and reported cases dealing with this subject have been few and far between. The Tennessee legislature “intended to
prohibit trusts, combinations, and agreements affecting all commerce not covered by the federal
statute, and upon which it had a right to legislate.” However, when an agreement between
business entities regulates or controls intangible
contract rights or services, establishing unreasonably high prices in the market for the services
which are its subject, Tennessee’s Trade Practices Act does not apply. Such was the decision
in an appeal presented to the Tennessee Court
of Appeals in Jo Ann Forman, Inc., v. National
Council On Compensation Insurance, Inc.
Forman concerned a dispute whether workers’ compensation insurance premiums were an
“article or product” within the purview of the act
or whether they constituted an “intangible” so
that the antitrust statutes did not apply. Tennessee Workers’ Compensation Law requires all employers, with limited exceptions, to purchase
workers’ compensation insurance or to qualify to
self-insure in order to provide benefits and pay
compensation for death, disablement, or injury to
their employees. These insurance policies are
contracts between the employer and the insurer,
and they are purchased in either a voluntary market or in an assigned risk context (also called the
“residual market”; it covers those employers who
typically have adverse loss experience and are
therefore unable to obtain coverage in the voluntary market). The employer who is classified
as an assigned risk obtains insurance according
to a state plan which, inter alia, requires all
insurance companies to participate and provide
insurance as insurers of last resort. Clearly, the
residual market mandate poses significant risks
for insurers, so many insurance companies minimize these risks and satisfy their obligations by
forming cooperative contractual arrangements (referred to in this case as “the Pool”) which pay
the assigned servicing carriers an allowance as
reimbursement for their obligatory expenses, and
assure them a reasonable profit.
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In Forman, the plaintiffs comprised various
corporations who had purchased workers’ compensation insurance. They brought suit to complain that the defendants, specified members of
“the Pool” containing workers’ compensation insurers doing business in Tennessee, entered into
one such agreement to inflate workers’ compensation insurance rates by charging excessive servicing carrier allowances which, in fact, had the
effect of raising the rates in both the residual and
the voluntary markets. Plaintiffs sought recovery
for the full amount of the allegedly excessive
premiums that they paid for their insurance policies on the ground that the contractual arrangement between the members of “the Pool” was
designed, or tended to control, the price of their
insurance in violation of Tennessee’s antitrust statute, Tenn. Code Ann. §47-25-101. The trial court
denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and the defendants appealed,
still insisting that because the express language
of the provision uses the words “products or articles,” insurance premiums do not fall within the
purview of the statute.

plied to “articles of foreign and domestic origin,”
and (2) that the only plausible construction may
be to outlaw efforts to control the price of the
building material, but that such was not the case.

The Tennessee Court of Appeals determined that
the instant case turned entirely on whether or not increased costs of workers’ compensation insurance involves a “product or article” within the meaning of the
Tennessee antitrust statutes. The plaintiffs’ argument
relied heavily on language in the opinion of the Tennessee Supreme Court in Standard Oil Co. v. State, 117 Tenn.
618, 643, 100 S.W. 705, 711 (1907), which stated: “The
Legislature clearly intended to prohibit trusts, combinations, and agreements affecting all commerce not covered by the federal statute, and upon which it had a right
to legislate. It did not intend to stop short of its
power to exceed it.”
Defendants asserted that this language was
mere dicta and, instead, that the Tennessee Supreme Court case, McAdoo Contractors, Inc. v.
Harris, 222 Tenn. 623, 439 S.W.2d 594, 597
(1969) was determinative. McAdoo concerned a
claim filed against the county, its architect, and
the county judge, alleging that they all fraudulently conspired to deprive the complainant of a
contract, in combination of restraint of trade contrary to Tenn. Code Ann. §69-101 (now codified
at §47-25-101). The McAdoo court decided (1)
that it was impossible to bring a contract award
under the statute because the express terms apSpring 2000

The Court of Appeals found that insurance premiums do not qualify as “product(s) or article(s)” within
the meaning of Tennessee Code Annotated section 4725-101, in keeping with the holding of the supreme court
in McAdoo. To paraphrase Justice Humphreys therein: it
was clear that the Tennessee Trade Practices Act expressly applies to articles of foreign and domestic origin
so that it would be virtually impossible to bring workers’ compensation insurance under the statute, which is
an intangible contract right or service.
In addition, the Forman court agreed with
the defendant that the specific language in Standard Oil upon which plaintiffs’ relied was “obiter
dictum.” As such, comments in an opinion do
not control when the point which was dictum is
presented for decision in a subsequent case.
Statements in a decision are authority only on the
point in judgment which arises in the particular
case before the court. The Court of Appeals
further quoted Justice Green of the United States
Supreme Court where he said: “Doubtless the
doctrine of stare decisis is a salutary one and to
be adhered to on all proper occasions; but it only
arises in respect of decisions directly upon the
points in issue.”
Since McAdoo was decided in 1969, numerous attempts have been made in the General
Assembly to amend the Trade Practices Act and
expand its scope. None have been successful.
Although thwarted attempts at legislation are not
the keenest guides to uncover legislative intent,
the Court of Appeals determined that these
amendment efforts would be unnecessary if the
present Trade Practices Act indeed covered “every conceivable . . . agreement or contract to
lessen or destroy competition and control prices”
as asserted in the Attorney General’s brief in Standard Oil. Further, the court stated “[c]ourts have
held that nonaction by a legislative body may be
a dubious guide but may become significant
where proposals for legislative change have been
repeatedly rejected.”
Forman tells us generally what types of
agreements and contracts in restraint of trade will
not violate the Tennessee Trade Practices Act.
Clearly, business arrangements which control pricVolume 1 Number 2
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ing should be planned so that they cover only
services and other intangibles which do not fall
within the purview of the Act. Although numerous legislative efforts have been aimed at expanding the scope and include other kinds of
economic activity, this has not yet occurred.
--Cheryl Davis

EMPLOYMENT
King v. TFE, Inc. , 1999 WL 675132 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Sept. 1, 1999)
In 1982, the Tennessee Court of Appeals in
Hamby v. Genesco, 627 S.W.2d 373 (Tenn.
App.1982) held that an employment handbook
can become a part of the employment contract.
Thus, it becomes imperative that attorneys who
have employers as clients inform them of the
possibility of their employee handbook being
considered contractually binding. King v. TFE,
Inc. sets forth the steps an employer should take
to maintain a non-binding handbook. In King,
the court determined whether an employee was
terminated in violation of contractually binding
provisions of an employment manual.
TFE, Inc. (“TFE”) gave Michael King (“King”)
an employee manual when they employed him
as a truck driver in 1988. In 1993, King was
involved in a driving accident during the course
of his employment. Having sustained injuries,
he was paid worker’s compensation disability
benefits while he was treated and recovering.
When King returned to work, he was informed that his employment was being terminated because of his involvement in a “major
preventable accident.” Thereafter, King requested
a driver committee review his termination, which
is the initial avenue for review of disciplinary
action according to the “Employee Handbook.”
The committee recommended that his accident
be deemed “unpreventable,” but King was not
reinstated. He then sued TFE for breach of an
alleged employment contract. The trial court
granted summary judgment to TFE holding that
the “employee handbook distributed by TFE did
not constitute an employment contract.” The court
reasoned that the relevant provisions in the
manual did not employ specific language binding TFE. King appealed.
Volume 1 Number 2
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In its opinion, the Tennessee Court of Appeals restated the well-established rule that a “contract for employment for an indefinite term is a
contract at will and can be terminated by either
party at any time without cause.” In Tennessee,
there is a presumption that an employee is an
employee at will. Nevertheless, “an employment contract can still exist with regard to other
terms of employment.”
An employee handbook can be a part of an
employment contract in Tennessee. However, it
“must contain specific language showing the
employer’s intent to be bound by the handbook’s
provisions.” The court further stated that, “The
language used must be phrased in binding terms,
interpreted in the context of the entire handbook, and read in conjunction with any other
relevant material, such as an employment application.” Courts generally will not interpret provisions as contractual between the employer and
employee if the employer reserves within the
handbook the unilateral right to modify such provisions.
King admits that he was an employee at
will when hired but argues that this status changed
when TFE issued its employee manual. The appellate court limited its review to the manual
provisions that governed TFE’s “Disciplinary Procedures,” “Rules and Regulations,” and “Involuntary Termination.” Under the “Disciplinary Procedures” section, the manual states that TFE “has
developed a guideline of violations of professional performance standards and reasonable disciplinary penalties.” It further states, “The company retains the right to modify, add to or eliminate work rules at any time as it deems necessary.” In the “Rules and Regulations” provision,
the handbook explains that the “rules and regulations and the penalties. . . are set forth as guidelines,” and that the “list of violations is not inclusive and the company may add to or modify it at
any time.” It also states that TFE will only “give
every consideration to their [the driver
committee’s] recommendations and findings.”
Under “Involuntary Termination,” the manual
states that TFE will “consider submitting the matter to an Arbitrator.” The Court then determined
that the language used clearly reflected TFE’s
intent not to be bound either by particular procedures set forth or by the “recommendation” of
Spring 2000
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the driver committee. It also added that the provisions in the handbook must be considered together with any other relevant material. Consequently, the Court found relevance in a document that King signed when he received his
employee manual expressing that the manual did
not create or establish an employment contract.
This case reminds transactional attorneys of
the importance of using non-binding language in
documents not intended to be contractual. As
the court noted, it is a good idea to take two
other steps to prevent a manual from becoming
a part of the employment contract. First, the
employer should expressly retain the right to
amend manual provisions. Secondly, the employer should have the employee sign a document acknowledging that the handbook is not a
contract between the employer and employee
when delivering the manual to the employee.
--Sarah H. W. Davis
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ARTICLES

Tennessee Tax Reform: How Does The F & E Tax
Affect Your Business?
T.J. Gentle*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In the midst of a fierce debate over tax reform,
the Tennessee General Assembly enacted legislation that
would relieve the $400 million budget deficit for the
upcoming year. 1 Though a state individual income tax
was proposed,2 as well as several other revenue generating alternatives, 3 the result was House Bill No. 1676.4
Effective July 1, 1999, 5 this legislation shifts much of
the burden of the state’s revenue deficiencies to limited
liability entities (LLEs) by levying a state franchise and
excise tax (“F & E tax”) on LLEs. 6 Although the longevity of the F & E tax is uncertain,7 businesses and
their lawyers are scurrying to find alternatives that limit
this new tax liability. 8
The F & E tax, which primarily taxed corporations
(both “C” and “S” corporations) prior to the new law,
will now levy a tax on limited partnerships (LPs), limited
liability partnerships (LLPs), limited liability companies
(LLCs), and business trusts. 9 Business organizations
not protected under the state’s limited liability statutes,
* T. J. Gentle is a third-year law student at the University
of Tennessee College of Law.
1. Governor Don Sundquist, An Outdated Tax System
Meets the 21st Century, 9 TENNESSEE’S BUSINESS 17 (1999).
2. H.B. 8002, 101st Leg., 2d Spec. Sess. (Tenn. 1999).
3. See House, Senate Agree on Elements of Budget-Tax
Solution, TENN. J., May 24, 1999, at 2 (providing other tax
reform proposals).
4. Tax Revision and Reform Act of 1999, 1999 Tenn. Pub.
Acts 406 (current version at TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-4-2001
(1999)).
5. If there are any questions about any of these provisions, contact the Tennessee Department of Revenue,
Taxpayer Service Division at 1-800-397-8395.
6. See Andree Sophia Blumstein, Temporary Tennessee
Excise, Franchise Tax Fix Signed Into Law, STATE TAX
TODAY, June 25, 1999, at 122 (discussing the F & E tax’s
scope and effective date).
7. House, Senate Agree on Elements of Budget-Tax
Solution, supra note 3, at 3.
8. Businesses Scramble to Figure Tax Hit, TENN. J., June
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such as sole proprietorships and general partnerships, remain exempt from the F & E tax.10 Corporations will be subject to the same F & E tax as
before. 11
The new tax12 adds a significant factor for new
and pre-existing businesses organized in Tennessee in
making choice-of-entity decisions as well as whether to
organize in Tennessee altogether. Since their enactment,13 the laws governing LLEs have enticed many out
of state businesses to organize in Tennessee.14 Also, an
overwhelming number of Tennessee businesses have
elected to organize as LLCs rather than corporations.
The purpose of this article is to provide
practitioners with an analysis and explanation of
the F & E tax so that it can be properly weighed
against the traditional factors (e.g., liability exposure, free transferability of interest, etc.) when
making a choice of entity decision. In Section II,
this article begins with a brief discussion of the
causes behind the F & E tax reform. Section III
7, 1999, at 2 (discussing the response of Tennessee
businesses to the F & E tax).
9. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-4-2004(16) (1999) (listing all
entities subject to tax).
10. Cf. Governor Don Sundquist, State of the State
Address (Feb. 8, 1999), in STATE TAX TODAY, Feb. 17, 1999,
at 31.
11. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-4-2004 (1999).
12. Both the excise tax and franchise taxes are actually
extensions of the prior law; however, the recent amendment will be referred to as the “new excise tax” or the “new
franchise tax” in order to distinguish between the original
tax and the extension.
13. The Tennessee LLC Act was enacted in 1994. Tennessee Limited Liability Act 1994 Tenn. Pub. Acts 868 (current
version TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-201-101 (1999)).
14. Stanley M. Chervin, The Impact of LLCs on Tennessee
Revenues, STATE TAX TODAY, Feb. 16, 1999, at 30, 34. Over
16,000 LLCs have organized in the state since 1994. Of
those 16,000, 77.3%, or 8,206, were not previously engaging in business within the state. Id.
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explains the intricacies of the new legislation.
Section IV provides examples of the impact thatthe
new tax will have on LLCs that engage in different business activities in Tennessee.

funds would pass through the LLE to the corporate interest holder outside the state. Thus, Tennessee was providing businesses with liability
protection while the businesses were passing
profits generated in Tennessee to their owners
in another state. If the corporate parents were
organized within Tennessee, the income would
have been subject to the corporate F & E tax. 21

II.

GROUNDWORK FOR TAX REFORM

The 101st General Assembly entered the 1999 Session with the task of responding to Governor Sundquist’s
request to “meet the challenges of the 21st Century.” 15
Throughout the regular session and both special sessions, legislators fiercely debated potential sources and
solutions to the budget deficit. While most of the nation, including Tennessee, was experiencing an economic
surplus, Tennessee legislators struggled to cut spending
and increase tax revenues. 16 Although actively lobbying for a personal income tax, Sundquist ultimately agreed
with legislators that a “fair business tax” would be the
answer to the budget deficit. Thus, House Bill No. 1676
was the legislative response to the budget crisis.
The “fair business tax,” 17 which was originally proposed by Sundquist at the 1999 “State
of the State Address,” targets businesses that benefit
from the statutory liability protections of the state,
but escape state taxation. One of the most cited
examples is the so-called “Kroger Loophole.” 18
This structure exploited a Tennessee Department
of Revenue (DOR) position that “the mere ownership of [a LLE] interest did not establish sufficient nexus for Tennessee to impose its taxes on
the owner.” 19 Businesses (such as Kroger) began organizing LLPs and LLCs in Tennessee, while the corporate interest holder, organized outside of the state, would
retain up to a 99% interest in the LLE.20 The businesses would generate profits within the state and the

15. Sundquist, supra note 10, at 31.
16. According to John. G. Morgan, Comptroller of the
Treasury of State of Tennessee, $81 million in cuts were
accepted by the legislature in the 2000 budget. John
Morgan, Tax Reform Options and Implications, 9
TENNESSEE’S BUSINESS 17 (1999).
17. Sundquist, supra note 10, at 34.
18. J. Leigh Griffith, Taxing Tennessee New Business
Taxes, TENN. BAR J., Aug. 1999, at 13.
19. Id. at 16.
20. New Taxes: Who, What , When, How, Where, TENN. J.,
July, 5, 1999, at 1.
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Due to the increased expenses that Tennessee was incurring from the newly formed LLE
businesses and the lack of tax revenue collected22
from these businesses, 23 the DOR had an economic foundation for sponsoring the new F & E
tax. 24 Considering the fierce opposition to the
personal income tax by many legislators and their
constituents, the F & E tax provided politicians
with a political safe haven while temporarily remedying the budget problem.

III. ANALYSIS OF THE F & E TAX
The F & E tax is basically an extension of the
corporate franchise and excise tax to any Tennessee passthrough entity that benefits from limited liability protection under the Tennessee Code (“T.C.A.”). In order to
understand how the F & E tax will affect Tennessee
businesses, the details of these new taxes must be clearly
understood. Thus, the intricacies of each tax are discussed below.

A.

Excise Tax

The excise tax is imposed upon an entity for “the
privilege of doing business . . . in Tennessee.” 25 The
excise tax is levied upon the net earning of an entity,

21. Id.
22. Sundquist, supra note 10, at 24. For example, one
business in Tennessee reorganized itself in 1997 and cut
its tax liability from $195,000 to $10 merely by changing
from a corporation to an LLC. Id.
23. Chervin, supra note 14, at 30-32.
24. Elizabeth C. McNichol, Governor Sundquist’s Revised
Tax Proposal Would Address Long-Standing Problems
with Tennessee’s Tax System (Apr. 1, 1999) <http://
www.cbpp.org/4-1-99sfp.htm> (providing research results
from the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities).
25. Cook Export Corp. v. King, 652 S.W.2d 896, 900 (Tenn.
1983).
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and therefore has characteristics similar to a business income tax.26 The new excise tax broadens the tax base in terms of the types of entities
that are subject to the tax and to some degree the
activities of those entities that bring the entities
within the scope of the tax. 27
The excise tax provides that all “taxpayers”
or “persons,” 28 “doing business in Tennessee,” 29
“shall, without exception other than as provided
herein, pay to the Commissioner of Revenue,
annually, an excise tax, in addition to all other
taxes, equal to six percent (6%) of the net earnings for the next preceding fiscal year for business done in this State during that fiscal year.” 30

1.

Defining “Taxpayer”

This provision contains several details that must
be examined. First, the definition of “taxpayer” has
been amended to include LLEs. Specifically, these entities include: LLC’s (T.C.A. section 48-201-101), LLP’s
(T.C.A. section 61-1-143), and LP’s (T.C.A. section 61-2101). In addition, T.C.A section 67-4-2004 includes within
its definition of “[p]erson” or “taxpayer” “every corporation, subchapter S corporation, . . . cooperative,
joint-stock association, business trust, regulated investment company, real estate investment trust,
state-chartered or national bank, state- or

26. See James Overstreet, Real Estate LLCs brace for Tax
Hike, MEMPHIS BUS. J., July 30, 1999, at 2 (comparing the
tax free status on LLCs prior to the new law with the entity
level excise tax).
27. See discussion infra, Section III.A.2.
28. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-4-2004(16) (1999).
29. Id. § 67-4-2004(7).
30. Id. § 67-4-2007.
31. Id. § 67-4-2004(16).
32. Id.
33. See Overstreet, supra note 26, at 1-3 (discussing how
businesses utilized the tax free status of LLEs and
providing how the new law may cause some businesses to
change structures).
34. Under the Federal “check-the-box” regulations, a
partnership, LLC, or any other LLE may elect to be taxed
as a corporation even if the entity would qualify as a
partnership. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a). Thus, an entity
taxed as a corporation under the I.R.C. will calculate its
Tennessee excise tax liability as a corporation. TENN. CODE
ANN. § 67-4-2006 (1999).
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federally-chartered savings and loan association
and any other organization or entity engaged in
business.” 31 However, specifically excluded from
the definition of “person” or “taxpayer” are sole
proprietorships and general partnerships. 32
By including LLEs within the definition of
“taxpayers,” Tennessee has negated many of the
pass-through characteristics that made them attractive business structures. 33 Prior to the new
law, a business could organize as an LLC (or any
other non-corporate LLE) without incurring an F
& E tax at the entity level. 34 The income would
“pass-through” to the individual partners or members of the entity. 35 The income received by that individual would then be subject to a federal income tax but
not a state level tax. However, the new excise tax will
levy a six percent (6%) tax on net earnings at the entity
level, thereby creating the effect of a dual-tax. Although
this revenue will be taxed by Tennessee at the entity
level, the pass-through status will still be respected for
federal income tax purposes. 36

2.

Closing the Loopholes

The definition of “doing business” 37 within
the state has been amended to exclude certain
exemptions, like “the Kroger Loophole.” 38 The
T.C.A. provided that an interest holder that merely
owned an interest in an LP was not “doing business” within the state if the “limited partner’s

35. For a detailed explanation of the pass-through
characteristics of LLEs, see Stuart Levine, Limited
Liability Companies, Limited Liability Partnerships,
Limited Liability Limited Partnerships, And Other Novel
Entities, 86 ALI-ABA 501, 507 (1996).
36. But see Dania Leatherman & Marie A. Nelson, The
Race Is On: Choosing a Business Entity, TENN. BAR J.,
Dec. 1999, at 24, 26 (providing federal income tax
consequences of converting from an LLE to traditional
pass-through entities).
37. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-4-2004(7). Other than repealing
a short list of exceptions, the new definition of “doing
business” is essentially the same. Under the new law,
“doing business” is defined as “any activity purposefully
engaged in, within Tennessee, by a person with the object
of gain, benefit, or advantage, consistent with the intent of
the General Assembly to subject such persons to the
Tennessee franchise, excise tax to the extent permitted by
the United States Constitution and the Constitution of the
State of Tennessee.” Id.
38. See supra notes 18 through 21 and accompanying text.
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only business activity in Tennessee is the holding of a limited partnership interest in a partnership located in or doing business in Tennessee;
and . . . [t]he limited partner has no right to exercise any power, management or control over the
partnership . . . .” 39

Thus, if a Tennessee business is the sole owner
of another Tennessee LLE, only the ultimate owner
would be subject to the tax. 42

Arguably, the removal of exempt status indicates the legislature’s intent to subject the interest holders outside of the state to the excise
tax. Conversely, the intent of the legislature may
not be important because the previously exempt
parties now must pay the excise tax at the entity
level (rather than the interest holder level). However, the DOR has responded to this dilemma.
The DOR’s official response is as follows:
The Department will continue to follow its longstanding policy not to attribute franchise and excise tax
nexus to a limited partner or the limited partner equivalent limited liability company member in a partnership
or limited liability company doing business in Tennessee, where that is its only contact with this state.
In addition, when a limited partnership or limited
liability company is subject to franchise and excise taxes,
the Department does not believe that it was the intent
of Chapter 406 of the Public Acts of 1999 to attribute
Tennessee franchise and excise tax nexus to a partner or
limited liability company member solely because of its
interest in the taxable entity. 40

3.

Calculating Net Earnings

The tax is levied at a rate of six percent
(6%) on net earnings. 43 The provisions defining
net earnings are found at T.C.A. section 67-42006. Under that section, a taxpayer determines
its net earnings depending upon its “entity status.” There are six categories: “C” corporations,
“S” corporations, “unitary businesses,” 44 partnerships (or entities taxed as partnerships for federal income tax purposes), single-member LLCs
(or entities taxed as individuals for federal income tax purposes), or business trusts. 45
The characterization of each class of entity relies heavily on how the Internal Revenue
Code (IRC) treats them for federal tax purposes.
For the purposes of this article, only the calculation for entities taxed as partnerships will be anal y z e d . 46
An entity taxed as a partnership calculates “net
earnings” as follows:
•

Ordinary income (or loss) under the I.R.C 47

•
Plus any specifically allocated items of income

Therefore, the DOR intends to enforce the
excise tax at the entity level first; however, the
new excise tax models the federal income tax
treatment of multi-level organization structures. 41

•
Less any specifically allocated items of expense

39. 1998 Tenn. Pub. Act. 1092, repealed by 1999 Tenn.
Pub. Acts 406 (“except such powers or capacities outlined
in § 61-2-302 that limited partners may exercise without
participating in the management or control of the partnership, and the limited partner, in fact, exercises no such
power, management or control over the partnership”).
40. Tennessee Department of Revenue, Frequently Asked
Questions Under the New Franchise and Excise Law
(visited Nov. 14, 1999) <http://www.state.tn.us/revenue/
faq.htm>.
41. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-4-2008(7)(D) (1999) (providing
exemption for certain LLEs that are part of a multi-level
structure).
42. For a detailed discussion of tax treatment of multi-level
structures, Griffith, supra note 18, at 17.

43. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-4-2007 (1999).
44. Unitary Business is defined at TENN. CODE ANN. § 674-2004(25) (1999).
45. The final category also includes estates, “other than a
decedent’s estate.” Id. § 67-4-2006(a)(6).
46. Since an overwhelming number of new businesses in
Tennessee are organized as LLCs, it seems appropriate to
focus on the possible treatment of LLCs.
47. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-4-2006(a)(4) (1999). This
subsection provides that any amount of ordinary income
or loss, as defined under the I.R.C., “increased or decreased by additional items of income or expense specifically allocated to partners or members under the provisions of Sections 701-761.” Id.
48. Id. This amount includes the amount subject to selfemployment tax, and “distributable or paid to each
partner or member.” Id. (emphasis supplied).
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Less amounts subject to self-employment
tax 48
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•

Less amounts contributed to qualified pension plan

•

Equals Net Earnings

T.C.A. section 67-4-2006(b) provides a laundry list
of items to both add to and subtract from the net earnings calculation. This provision provides the items that
distinguish the Tennessee excise tax on net earnings and
ordinary income under the borrowed federal income tax
provisions. Examples of items that would increase net
earnings (above ordinary income of an I.R.C. partnership) include gains from the sale of assets held in investment, business assets, and rental income.49 Conversely, items that would reduce net earnings include
charitable contributions, loss from the sale of assets held
for investment, and loss from the sale of business assets. 50
Also, the new excise tax limits the use of a net
operating loss for LLEs. Specifically, an LLE cannot
carry forward any net operating loss from prior years if
the LLE was not subject to the excise tax during
those years. 51

4.

Exemptions

The new excise tax retains many of the corporate exemptions provided in the prior law. 52

49. Id. § 67-4-2006(a)(4).
50. Id.
51. Id. § 67-4-2006(c)(1).
52. Id. § 67-4-2008. The retained exemption includes: (i)
Tennessee corporations meeting specific industrial
development requirements; (ii) corporations that actively
operate or build more than fraternal organizations (e.g.,
Mason Lodges); (iii) investment companies or funds
organized as “a unit investment trust taxable as a grantor
trust;” and (iv) credit unions meeting specific requirements.
53. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-4-2008(5) (1999). The venture
capital funds must be “formed and operated for the
exclusive purpose of buying, holding and/or selling
securities, including debt securities, primarily in
non-publicly traded companies on its own behalf and not
as a broker.” Id.
54. Id. § 67-4-2008(6). Other requirements must be
fulfilled in order for a farming LLE to qualify for exempt
status (i.e. substantially all of the businesses are related to
farming as well as other requirements).
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In addition, certain exemptions specifically cover LLEs.
These exemptions include LLCs, LLPs, and LPs engaged
in the business of venture capital funds, 53 farming,54
and others. 55 Another exemption exclusively for LLEs
existing as of May 1, 1999, exempts businesses “engaged in the business of acquiring notes, accounts receivable [etc.]”56
5.

Allocating Net Earnings

The allocation and apportionment provisions
attempt to maximize the tax base, without infringing upon any U.S. Constitutional provisions.57
The apportionment statute states that a taxpayer
who conducts “business activities” in Tennessee
and outside of the state “shall allocate or apportion its net earnings.” 58 The rules for apportionment are in T.C.A. sections 67-4-2010 through
67-4-2012. Because of the intricacies of these
rules, they will be discussed only as appropriate
in Part IV.

B.

Franchise Tax

The Tennessee franchise tax is imposed at a rate
of $.25 per $100.00 (or .25%) of the greater of (1) the
entity’s “net worth” (or apportioned net worth) as determined in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP);59 or (2) the value of property

55. Id. There is another exemption for an LLE: “holding of
one or more personal residences.” However, this exemption requires that “one or more of the members or partners
reside” in the personal residence and “[a]t least
ninety-five percent (95%) of the voting rights, capital
interest or profits of the entity are owned either by natural
persons who are relatives of one another or by trusts for
their benefit.” Id.
56. Id. § 67-4-2008(7).
57. See, e.g., Geoffrey, Inc. v. South Carolina, 437 S.E. 2d
13, 14 (S.C. 1993), cert. denied 114 S. Ct. 550 (1993)
(“Imposition of state income tax on foreign corporation
engaged in ownership, licensing and management of
trademarks, trade names, and franchises of its corporate
parent, satisfied due process clause requirement of a link
or connection between state and corporation”).
58. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-4-2010(a) (1999).
59. Id. § 67-4-2106(a).
60. Id. § 67-4-2108(a)(1).

Spring 2000

30

Transactions TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

owned and used in Tennessee.60 The minimum franchise tax also has been increased from $10 to $100. 61
Like the excise tax, the franchise tax now includes LLEs
within its definition of taxpayer, thereby subjecting these
entities to a new tax.62 In addition to including LLEs
within the scope of the franchise tax, the legislature
also provided a new definition for “net worth,” thereby
changing the base of the tax.

discussed below, this provision may prove troublesome
for some business types (e.g., real estate LLPs and LLCs).68

The new definition is intended to create a more
uniform application of the law by requiring taxpayers to
use GAAP. The new definition requires that a taxpayer
calculate net worth as the “difference between the value
of a taxpayer’s total assets, less its total liabilities, determined
in accordance with [GAAP] for the tax year covered by
the required return.” 63 The law also provides that
“[p]roper reductions of asset and liability accounts used
to determine net worth for franchise tax purposes will
be allowed if they are in accordance with [GAAP].” 64
In an attempt to head off any future miscalculations, the DOR issued a public notice providing that
regulation 1320-6-1-16 is no longer valid.65 This regulation provided: “All reserves and allocations of surplus
which do not represent definite and accrued legal liabilities or proper reductions in asset accounts must be
included in determining the measure of the franchise
tax.”66 By repealing this regulation, the DOR is promoting a uniform application of franchise tax in an attempt to conform with GAAP.
One potentially devastating characteristic of
the franchise tax is included in T.C.A. section 674-2108(a)(1). This section provides: “The measure of
the tax hereby imposed shall in no case be less than the
actual value of the property owned, or property used, in
Tennessee, excluding exempt inventory.” 67 As will be

Apparently, the franchise tax is not intended to
subject a Tennessee corporation or LLE to multiple levels
of state franchise tax liability. Stated differently, a
bisomess organization consisting of multiple levels of
wholly owned subsidiaries, all of which are organized
under Tennessee law, is only expected to pay the franchise tax at the ultimate interest holder level. T.C.A.
section 67-4-2107 provides: “The value of an interest .
. . held by the taxpayer in any other taxpayer
paying the tax herein levied and actually doing
business in this State shall be deducted from the
measure of the tax of the first taxpayer.” One
commentator noted that since LLEs are passthrough structures under the I.R.C, “the income
of most LLEs would automatically be included in
the income of their owners. If one or more
owners are pass-through entities, the income of
the first LLE and the second LLE would also be
included with the income of the ultimate
owner.” 69
This provision, along with the apportionment provisions 70 of the franchise tax, appears
to reduce the likelihood of multiple levels of
taxation. 71 However, if a Tennessee franchise
taxpayer holds an interest in an entity organized
in another state that taxes the out-of-state entity
for income generated within its borders, the income will be taxed twice since Tennessee will
tax the income to its ultimate holder. 72 This dual taxation would not occur if the out-of-state business was
considered to be “doing business”73 in Tennessee because of the apportionment rules. 74
However, the apportionment rules do not
provide for the allocation of income to entities

61. Id. § 67-4-2119.
62. Id. § 67-4-2004(16).
63. Id. § 67-4-2106(b) (emphasis supplied).
64. Id.
65. Tennessee Department of Revenue, Frequently Asked
Questions Under the New Franchise and Excise Law
(visited Nov. 14, 1999) <http://www.state.tn.us/revenue/
faq.htm.>.
66. Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. tit. 13, ch. 1320-6-1-16
(repealed 1999).
67. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-4-2108(a)(3) (1999).
68. See Overstreet, supra note 26, at 1 (discussing the
potential impact of the franchise tax on real estate
LLEs).
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69. Griffith, supra note 18, at 17.
70. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 67-4-2107 to 67-4-2109, 67-4-2110
(1999).
71. It is possible that such a system could violate the
dormant commerce clause. See Barclays Bank PLC v.
Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298 (1994), cited in Steve
Christensen, Note, Formulary Apportionment: More
Simple--On Balance Better?, 28 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS.
1133, 1142 n.50 (1997).
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not doing business within the state. Possibly to remedy
the due process questions that may emerge, the legislature provided an alternative franchise tax base.75

C.

Other Provisions

1.

Enforcement

The DOR “may disregard any entity created
or transaction made which has no business purpose or is created or made with the primary purpose of evading either the federal income tax or
the franchise tax.” 76 The legislature added another incentive to prevent businesses from purposefully evading the F & E tax: “It is a Class E
felony for any person willfully to attempt in any
manner to evade or defeat any tax due the State
of Tennessee. Each act done in violation hereof
is a separate offense.” 77

2.

Estimated Payments

Taxpayers that have a combined franchise
and excise tax liability of $5000 are required to
make quarterly estimated franchise and excise
tax payments. 78

IV.

IMPACT OF THE F & E TAX

According to a survey conducted by the DOR,
since 1994, 16,000 LLCs were organized in Tennessee.79
Due to the popularity of the LLC structure, this analysis will focus on the use of LLCs in transacting business. According to the DOR, businesses engaged in
real estate, retail, and manufacturing accounted for nearly
one-half of all Tennessee LLCs. 80 Of these business
types, the F & E tax will have varying implications.

72. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-4-2106 (1999).
73. Id. § 67-4-2106(b).
74. Id. §§ 67-4-2107 to 67-4-2109, 67-4-2110.
75. Id. § 67-4-2112.
76. Id. § 67-4-2112(c)(3).
77. Id. § 67-1-1440.
78 . Id. § 67-4-2015. Generally, each quarterly payment
must be the lesser of 25% of combined franchise/excise
liability for the preceding tax year, or 25% of 80% (i.e., 20%
)of combined franchise/excise liability for the current year.
For tax years beginning on or after July 1, 1999 and before
July 1, 2000, quarterly payments must be the greater of
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A.

Real Estate Market

In the case of a real estate company organized as an LLC, since the franchise tax is calculated by determining the value of the taxpayer’s
assets less liabilities, it would appear that the
real estate business would not incur any substantial tax liability. However, the franchise tax contains a limitation: “The measure of the tax hereby
imposed shall in no case be less than the actual
value of the property owned . . . in Tennessee .
. . .” 81 Therefore, an LLC that owns a $2 million
dollar shopping mall (with a $1.5 million mortgage) would calculate its tax as follows: 82
The greater of
Net Worth
shopping mall --

$2,000,000 (value)

mortgage -- 1,500,000 (liabilities)
Net worth = The greater of the difference o f
assets less liabilities ($500,000)
Calculation of Tax
$500,000 x .0025 = $1,250
or
Actual Value of the Property within the State
shopping mall $2,000,000 (value)
Calculation of Tax
$2,000,000 x .0025 = $5,000
In this case, the LLC would be forced to pay
$5,000 in franchise tax because the shopping
mall is located within Tennessee. Although the
LLC should arguably only have to pay the tax on
the difference between the actual value and liabilities, the Code specifically requires that the

25% of combined franchise/excise liability for the preceding tax year, or 25% of 50% (i.e., 12.5%)of combined
franchise/excise liability for the current year. Id.
79. See Chervin, supra note 14, at 2.
80. Id. at 4. The percentages were as follows:
real estate
26.5%
retail
12.7
manufacturing
10.0
81. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-4-2108(a)(1) (1999).
82. This example is a simplification for the sake of clarity
and does not include other factors that would affect the
LLC’s tax liability.
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tax base be no less than the actual value of the property.
In this case, the LLC is required to pay seventy-five
percent (75%) more ($3750) solely because the shopping mall is within the state. In addition to the franchise
tax, the LLC would still be subject to the excise tax.
Thus, a developer who chose to organize as an LLC in
order to avoid liability must now pay an unexpected tax.
The same developer may choose another structure if the burden of the franchise tax outweighs the
benefit of limited liability. For example, if the
developer could arrange non-recourse financing
for the shopping mall, the developer may not be
as concerned about personal liability. Assuming
that the developer is not very concerned about
potential tort or environmental liability, a sole
proprietorship or general partnership (if the developer is accompanied by another party) may
be a better alternative.
Conversely, the F & E tax may seem insignificant to another group of developers. If the
developers pursue a risky venture in which they
were not able to obtain non-recourse financing
,or if there was a high risk of other liabilities
(e.g., environmental or tort), the potential that
each partner could be held personally liable would
weigh heavily in their choice of entity decision.
Although the general partnership is exempt from
both the franchise and excise taxes, 83 the benefits of the protection from liability in cases such as this
appear to outweigh the exempt status of the general
partnership. 84
Also, there are other provisions that may
be applicable to a particular real estate transaction. For example, one provision excludes the
value of any property from the net worth determination for the franchise tax while construction
is in progress. 85

83. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-4-2004(16) (1999) (listing all
entities subject to tax).
84. See Overstreet, supra note 26, at 4.
85. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-4-2108 (1999). The statute
states: “There shall not be included within the meaning
hereof the value of any property while construction of
same is in progress and, in addition thereto, there is no
actual utilization of such property by the taxpayer either in
whole or in part.” Id.
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B.

Retail Market

According to the DOR, twelve percent (12%) of
the Tennessee LLCs are in the retail market. With the
exception of businesses like Kroger, a large number of
these retail businesses are believed to be the
classic “Mom and Pop” stores. Although these
smaller retailers clearly benefit from liability protection, many businesses operated as general partnerships and sole proprietorships before 1994. 86
Therefore, many of these businesses may be
tempted to waive the liability protection if the F
& E tax burden is too high.
Assume that the Mom & Pop store is valued at around $750,000 and Mom and Pop share
the interest in the LLC that owns the store (which
includes inventory, machines, land, a building
and others items of value). If Mom and Pop do
not receive a salary as owner-employees, but
rather receive a share of self-employment income generated by the store each year, they are
allowed to reduce the excise tax base by the
amount of income subject to self-employment
tax. 87 Thus, self-employment income is deductible for excise tax purposes. This factor may
encourage some LLC members to stick around.

C.

Manufacturers

The DOR estimates that ten percent (10%) of Tennessee LLCs are in the business of manufacturing. 88 In
a study conducted by the DOR, approximately seventytwo percent (72%) of Tennessee LLCs provided that
protection from liability was their primary reason for
choosing LLC status. 89 Manufacturers face liabilities
that are unique to their business activities; therefore,
some owners would not be willing to drop limited liabil-

86. 40.3% of the Tennessee LLCs operated as
proprietorships before electing to organize as an LLC and
25.8% were previously general partnerships. Chervin,
supra note 14, at 30-32.
87. Self-employment tax is the Social Security and
Medicare tax for individuals who work for themselves, like
Mom and Pop.
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ity status. For manufactures that are not in a position to
forgo limited liability, the F & E tax will be eminent.90
However, the impact of the F & E tax may not be significant depending on the type of product manufactured.
For example, a company that manufactures computer software may have little F & E tax liability compared to manufacturers of traditional goods. The software manufacturer (“Software LLC”) is a moderately
sized business with around 20 employees. Software LLC’s
primary assets are its intangible assets, which include
several trademarks and patents. 91 Software LLC’s most
valuable equipment includes several computers, CDrewriters, and several peripherals. The business does
not need a lot of space, so it leases a modest sized
office building. Like many software companies in the
industry, Software LLC generates high revenues; however, Software LLC will have virtually no net earnings. 92
Even if Software LLC’s revenues are high, it reduces
net earnings by all of the deductions available to partnerships provided in I.R.C. sections 701 to 761. 93 Given
the nature of the software business, Software LLC should
be able to significantly reduce its net earnings by its
operating costs, such as amortizing research and development, compensating its staff, and depreciating its computer equipment.94 Thus, software LLC’s excise tax liability will not be significant. Likewise, Software LLC’s
franchise tax liability will be negligible. The tax base for

88. Chervin, supra note 14, at 4.
89. Id. at 3. Note that all LLCs did not respond to this
question, but of the 9,839 that did respond, 7,101 provided
that protection from liability was the primary reason for
choosing LLC form. Id.
90. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-4-2004(16) (1999).
91. This example is fairly typical for new businesses in the
technology industry. For a discussion of the tax and nontax benefits relevant to high tech business in making a
choice of entity decision, see John M. Cunningham, the
Limited Liability Company: Entity Of Choice For HighTech Start-Ups?, 4 COMPUTER LAWYER 11 (1996).
92. See No Margin For Error, COMPUTER BUS. REV., Jan. 3,
1994, at 8 (providing examples of the typical computer and
software manufacturer’s balance sheets).
93. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-4-2006(a)(4) (1999).
94. See Cary B. Edgar, The Taxation Of Franchise,
Trademark And Trade Name Licenses And Sales, 3
COMPUTER LAWYER 1, 2-3 (1990) (discussing the rapid
depreciation and amortization of technology asset).
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the franchise tax will likely be the value of the property
owned and used within the state (instead of the
company’s net worth). This value will be mostly comprised of computer hardware, trademarks, patents, and a
factor95 for rental property.96 Due to the short useful
life of computers and software, the book value of these
assets will deteriorate rapidly. 97 Thus, Software LLC
would not have a high net worth (in relation to its earnings) and would not pay much franchise tax. LLCs like
Software LLC will not be dramatically affected by the F
& E tax. Therefore, the new tax will have little impact
on companies like Software LLC when making a choice
of entity. Conversely, manufacturers in more traditional
markets will not escape the F & E tax so easily.
For example, a manufacturer of household furniture (“Furniture LLC”) has about 25 employees. Its primary assets are industrial woodworking machines, delivery trucks, land (lumber yard), and a building (where the
factory is located).98 Unlike Software LLC, most of
Furniture LLC’s assets are tangible property. 99
Furniture LLC’s market share is similar to Software LLC (relative to their industries); therefore, Furniture LLC has a healthy amount of revenue. For the
purposes of calculating net earnings, its revenue will
primarily be offset by items such as depreciation of the
building and trucks, payroll deductions, and lumber purchases. After reducing its revenue by those amounts,

95. The rent value included in the tax base is calculated by
using the amount paid in annual rents multiplied by
factors, which differ based on the type of property used
(the factor for real property is eight; equipment and
machinery is three; furniture is two; and mobile equipment is one). For example, if Software LLC pays $2,000 per
month to rent its office, the rent value would be calculated
as follows:
Annual Rent equals $2,000 x 12 (months) = $24,000
Rent Value equals $24,000 x 8 (factor for real property) =
$192,000
The rent value would be included in the tax base for the
franchise tax.
96. See Timothy J. Kenesey, Simplifying The Tax Treatment Of Intangibles: It’s About Time—But Let’s Not
Forget Computer Software, 1992 ILL. L. REV. 853, 855
(discussing the value of intangibles and other assets in
high tech industries).
97. See Edgar, supra note 96, at 2-3.
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Furniture LLC would typically have more net earnings
than Software LLC. Even if it did not, Furniture LLC’s
franchise tax liability would be substantially higher due
to its higher asset base. Even after depreciation, Furniture LLC’s assets would have a higher book value considering that the useful life of its assets are much longer.
Although these two companies may have similar
revenues, the characterization of their assets are largely
the base of their tax liability (specifically franchise tax
liability). Between these two manufacturers, the more
traditional company will have more tax liability. However, neither company would be in a position to forgo
limited liability status based on the F & E tax. Note that
both companies may be able to reduce their excise tax
burden if they qualify for an “industry machinery” credit
provided in T.C.A. §67-4-2009(4).

V.

CONCLUSION

As the income tax debate continues, proposals for repealing the Hall Tax and the F & E
tax continue to surface. Although the longevity of the
F & E tax is in question, it clearly presents an issue that
businesses now have to face. Although some businesses
may elect to drop LLE status until the F & E tax is
repealed, many have indicated that they will weather the
storm. Although the end may be soon for the F & E
tax, the legislature may find it difficult to repeal the law
considering the broad base of taxable revenue it has
tapped. Regardless, the debate continues and, at least
for now, the legislature has placed the state’s tax burden
on the business community.

98. See Bonnie Arnett, Change Comes To The Furniture
Dealer, ADVANTAGE, March 1, 1987, at 77 (discussing the
operations of a traditional furniture manufacturer and
providing how technology has changed the industry).
99. Jerry B. Williams, Lipscomb “Lip” Davis III: Can’t Get
The Sawdust Out Of His Blood, ADVANTAGE, Jan. 1, 1988, at
106 (discussing the major startup costs associated with
furniture manufacturing).
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I’ll Gladly Pay You Tuesday for a Hamburger Today:
An Explanation of Tennessee’s Cash-Advance Industry
Lawrence M. Magdovitz II*

I. Introduction to Cash Advances

counts. 4 Today these “tr ue” check-cashing businesses have found it profitable, if not necessary,
to move from cashing checks to making cash
advances. 5

In the 1990s, Tennessee witnessed the proliferation of a new financial institution - the cashadvance business. This new enterprise allows
customers to get cash advances that they normally would not be able to secure through traditional lending institutions. While this type of
lending is usually referred to as a cash advance,
this term is often used interchangeably with “payday lending, delayed deposit checking, checkdeferral transactions, cash-advance loans, or
check-cashing.” 1 Many simply refer to businesses
that make cash advances as “check-cashers” because, on the surface, the transaction involves
merely exchanging a customer’s personal check
for money. However, the actual financial workings involve much more than cashing a check. 2
Consequently, “check-cashing” is a misleading
term for describing these businesses. 3 Traditionally, check-cashing stores cashed welfare, social
security, or company checks for a fee or sold
money orders to customers without checking ac-

A more accurate name for cash advance businesses is “deferred presentment services” - the
name the Tennessee legislature chose in regulating these businesses. 9 In a typical deferred presentment service, a business accepts a personal
check from a customer, dated as of the date the

* Lawrence M. Magdovitz II is a third-year law student at
the University of Tennessee College of Law.
1. See generally Rodney Ho, Fees of Quick-Cash Chains
Draw Scrutiny, WALL ST . J., June 10, 1997 at B1, available
in 1997 WL-WSJ 2423635.
2. While this lack of precision in a descriptive term is
somewhat trivial, it is necessary to point this inaccuracy
out to the uninitiated. However, even the senior divisional
vice-president of Check Into Cash, Inc., one of the
nation’s largest cash-advance businesses, said, “For a flat
fee, we cash a customer’s personal check and hold it until
their next payday.” Check-Cashing Chain Opens Office
in Rock Hill, S.C., KNIGHT-RIDDER TRIB. BUS. NEWS, Aug.
7, 1998, available in 1998 WL 16331253.
3. The media continues the mischaracterization of this
type of transaction as “cash[ing] a customer’s personal
check” even two years after the Deferred Presentment

Services Act was enacted. Check Into Cash, Inc. Checks
Into New Location, TENNESSEAN (Nashville), Apr. 21, 1999,
at 1E, available in 1999 WL 17427178.
4. Ho, supra note 1, at B1.
5. Id.
6. See Sheila Wissner, Thriving Loan Industry’s Secrecy
Worries Officials; These High-Profit, Quick Cash Business
esAttractive to Organized Crime, Mob Specialist Says,
TENNESSEAN (Nashville), Apr. 18, 1999, at 1A, available in
1999 WL 5764723.
7. Id.
8. Rebecca Ferrar, Cash-Advance Law Coming up for
Renewal; Who Cares About 391% Interest on 14-Day
Loan? KNOXVILLE NEWS-SENTINEL, Jan. 24, 1994, at D1,
available in 1999 WL 9154051.
9. Deferred Presentment Services Act of 1997, 1997 Tenn.
Pub. Acts ch. 255, § 2.
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This new sector of the financing industry is
particularly relevant to the Tennessee legal community because, as of April 1999, there were
almost 700 cash-advance businesses, run by approximately 300 different companies, operating
in Tennessee. 6 In total, these cash-advance operations loaned more than $200 million in 1998. 7
Spurred by the success of such lending, Tennessee is currently home to two of the nation’s biggest cash-advance companies: Check into Cash,
Inc. and National Cash Advance, both based in
Cleveland, Tennessee. 8
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check is written, with the face amount payable
to the business. The business then writes one of
its own checks to that customer, payable immediately, for an amount less than the face value of
the customer’s personal check. The difference
between the amount given the customer and the
face value of the customer’s personal check is
the fee that the deferred presentment business
takes for its services. 10 When the time for repayment arrives, usually fourteen or thirty days
later, the business either cashes the customer’s
check or the customer pays the amount of the
check in cash to the business. In a nutshell, the
business defers presentment of the customer’s
check to the customer’s bank for a certain amount
of time in return for a fee.

II.The Deferred Presentment Services Act of 1997

This article does not weigh the social costs
and benefits of the cash-advance business. This
article’s purpose is to educate and inform the
legal community by explaining the cash-advance
business, how it works in Tennessee, the statutory limitations the state has placed on cash advances, and legal issues that arise for both customers and operators of these businesses.

10. The fee charged is essentially interest. See infra text
accompanying notes 14-16. However, the Tennessee state
legislature was deliberate in classifying the amount
charged as a fee rather than interest, and the reason is set
forth in the section describing the Act that follows below.
Id.; Wissner, supra note 6, at A1.
11. Deferred Presentment Services Act, 1997 Tenn. Laws
Pub. Acts ch. 255, §§ 2-20 (codified at Tenn. Code. Ann.
§§45-17-101 to –119 (1999). The Act, passed in 1997, was
originally slated to expire on October 1, 1999. Id. However,
in March of 1999, the Tennessee legislature amended the
Act by deleting the expiration provision, thus allowing the
Act to remain in effect. Act of March 17, 1999, 1999 Tenn.
Laws Pub. Acts ch. § 14 (S.B. 49) (repealing the October
sunset date of the Act and extending the term of the law
indefinitely).
12. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 45-17-102(4), 45-17-112(d), 45-17112 (g). This agreement is a product of the Tennessee
legislature’s attempt to keep these cash advances arm’sSpring 2000

In Tennessee, cash advances are governed
by the Deferred Presentment Services Act
(“Act”).11 When a customer enters a licensed
cash-advance business (“licensee”), she must first
be given a written agreement that explains in
“clear, understandable language, the fees to be
charged by the licensee,” and the date on which
the customer’s check will be deposited by the
licensee. 12 After the customer has “read” and
signed the deferred presentment agreement, the
customer writes a check for a certain amount
made payable to the licensee. The check cannot
be postdated; it must be dated the day it is written,13 although both parties know that the customer most likely has insufficient funds in her
bank account to cover the check at that time. In
return for the customer’s check, the licensee gives
the customer a check or cash in the amount of
the face value of the customer’s check less the
fee charged by the licensee. 14 The licensee may
not charge a fee that exceeds the lesser of 15%
of the face value of the customer’s check or $30. 15
Within thirty-one days of the transaction, either
the customer must pay the face amount of the

length transactions and to provide fair notice to the
customer of the cost of the cash advances. However,
cash-advance customers rarely, if ever, read the terms of
the written agreement.
13. TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-17-112(j) (Supp. 1999); see, e.g.,
Ferrar, supra note 8 at D1.
14. Id. § 45-17-112(m).
15. Id. § 45-17-112(b). If a customer receives a $100 cash
advance for fourteen days, the customer would write a
check for $115 which, if held (or renewed each month) for a
year, is an annual percentage rate of 449%. While on its
face the fee may appear to be usurious interest, the Act
specifically exempts cash advances from Tennessee’s
usury laws by saying the “fees” are not interest. Deferred
Presentment Services Act, 1997 Tenn. Laws Pub. ch. 255,
§§ 3(d), 13(b) (codified at TENN. CODE. ANN. §§ 45-17102(4), 112(b)(2) (1999)).
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check to the licensee or the licensee must present
the check to the bank for payment or deposit. 16
To protect consumers from the lure of easy
money, customers may have no more than two
checks outstanding with any licensee and the
aggregate amount of those checks may not exceed $500. 17 To this end, eac h licensee must
question the customer regarding any outstanding
checks to other licensees. In response, the customer is obligated to state, in writing, “(1) that
[she has] no more than two checks outstanding to
any licensee, and (2) that the aggregate face value
of such checks does not exceed the statutory
limit.” 18 Although the legislature had good intentions in limiting the number of a customer’s
outstanding cash advances, the statute does not
have its intended effect. Since the Act applies to
the cash-advance business and not the customer,19
so long as the licensee “inquires” whether the
customer has multiple outstanding cash advances
and the customer lies, the customer can obtain as
many cash advances as she desires. 20

16. Id. § 45-17-112(d). In practice, most cash-advance
businesses do not make the advances for longer than
fourteen days because they can advance the same money
twice in one month rather than only once a month, thereby
increasing their collective rate of return. See also infra text
accompanying notes 37-40.
17. Id.
18. Id. § 45-17-112(p). Without any further investigation,
the licensee can rely on the customer’s written representation regarding outstanding checks to other licensees. Id.
In practice, this written representation is made a part of the
written agreement concerning the terms of the cash
advance and is rarely read by the customer. An even rarer
occurrence is a customer who accurately states to a
licensee how many outstanding deferred presentment
checks they have with all other licensees. See, e.g., John
Hendren, More States Allow Triple-Digit Loan Rates
Despite Consumer Complaints, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 9,
1999, at *, 1999 WL 2230035. As Hendren and other
authors suggest, most cash-advance customers go to
several cash-advance businesses every week. These
customers carry out a juggling act, “robbing Peter to pay
Paul” every month. See id.
19. Deferred Presentment Services Act, 1997 Tenn. Laws
Pub. ch. 255, §§ 3-4 (codified at Tenn. Code. Ann. §§ 4517-102(5), 103 (1999)).
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The commissioner of financial institutions
for the State of Tennessee possesses broad powers to enforce the Act. 21 Anyone wishing to
operate a deferred presentment business must
have a license, granted by the commissioner, for
each location. 22 In order to effectively investigate possible violations by licensees the commissioner is “empowered to inspect the business
premises, books and records of any business licensed under the Act,” at a cost to the licensed
business of $200 per day. 23 In addition, the
commissioner may also summon witnesses for
examination under oath concerning matters related to the deferred presentment services provided by a licensee, or someone reasonably suspected of providing such services. 24
A cash advance business must comply with
several notice requirements and information filings. It must maintain the books, records, and
accounts specified by the commissioner and retain them for at least the preceding two years. 25
The business must conspicuously display its de-

20. See, e.g., John Hendren, Lobbying Money Helping to
Persuade Legislators to Legalize Payday Loans, ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWSWIRES, Feb. 22, 1999; Hendren, supra note
18, at *; Ho, supra note 1, at B1.
21. TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-17-105 (1999).
22. Id. § 45-17-103. Potential licensees must file an
application for a cash-advance license with the commissioner, who is responsible for granting, denying, suspending, and revoking licenses in certain situations. Id. §§ 4517-105, 45-17-114(a), 45-17-114(b). To apply for a license, a
potential licensee must demonstrate that it has a minimum
net worth of $25,000, and that it has the financial responsibility, experience, and general capability to conduct the
business in a fair and lawful manner. Id. § 45-17-104(a).
The application fee is $500 for each license; if the license
is granted, the fee is used as the license fee for the first
license year. Id. § 45-17-106. A license lasts until September 30th of the following year. Id. § 45-17-110. On or
before September 1 of the following year, each license may
be renewed with payment of a $500 renewal fee and a
renewal application showing continued compliance with
the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated § 45-17104.
23. Id. § 45-17-111(b) (inspection fees cannot exceed
$1,200 per year).
24 . Id. § 45-17-111.
25. Id. § 45-17-112(a).
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ferred presentment license and a notice describing the charges imposed by the licensee. 26 A
licensee must also file a written report with the
commissioner after certain, significant events affecting the cash-advance business’s financial position or reputation. 27 Finally, each licensee must
file an annual report with the commissioner by
September 1 of each year for every location that
a licensee operates. 28

holder of the check is entitled to civil remedies30
and the issuer could be subject to criminal penalties. 31 However, if a cash advance customer’s
check is returned from a bank “due to insufficient funds, closed account or a stop payment
order,” 32 the licensee’s remedies are limited to
“all civil means available and allowed by law to
collect the check.” 33 Unlike the typical creditor, 34 , a cash-advance business cannot recover
attorney’s fees or interest in a suit to collect payment of a check. 35 Furthermore, no person who
issues a personal check to a licensee under the
Act may be charged with the crime of issuing a
worthless check under Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-14-121. 36

III. Selected Legal Matters Commonly Arising from
Cash Advances
In discussing legal matters arising from operating a cash-advance business, a hard look must
be taken at the remedies available to licensees
when a deferred presentment check is refused
or, more simply, not repaid. 29 In general, if a
person writes a check and fraudulently stops payment on the check or allows the check to be
dishonored because of insufficient funds, a closed
account, or lack of an authorized signature, the

26. Id. § 45-17-112(n).
27. Id. § 45-17-109. These events include the following:
bankruptcy filing or reorganization by the licensee; the
institution of revocation or suspension proceedings
against the licensee by any state or governmental
authority; the denial of the opportunity to conduct
deferred presentment services business by any state or
governmental authority; a felony indictment or conviction
of the licensee or any of its directors, officers, or principals; and any other events identified by the commissioner.
Id.
28. Id. § 45-17-119. The report must provide the commissioner with financial reports, including a balance sheet and
an income statement. Id. These annual reports are used
to gather information concerning the effectiveness of the
Act’s restrictions on the cash-advance industry and its
overall economic effect. See, e.g., Ferrar, supra note 8, at
D1.
29. Ho, supra note 1, at B1. Typical cash-advance
businesses have a 10% default rate, while credit cards
have a lower default rate of 6.5%. Id.
30. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-29-101(a) (Supp. 1999). Specifically, the holder may recover the face amount of the check;
Spring 2000

One scheme that arose in the cash-advance
industry is “loan splitting.” 37 A cash-advance
business has an incentive to make fourteen-day
loans for small amounts, because it receives the
greatest return on a fourteen-day loan with a principal amount of $170 or less. 38 Loan splitting
may be illustrated as follows. If a licensee makes

ten percent interest per annum on the face amount of the
check; or any unpaid balance from the date of execution
until full payment is made, including reasonable service
charges incurred in attempting to collect on the check,
civil court costs, and reasonable attorneys fees. Id.
31 Id. § 39-14-121. It is a misdemeanor to issue a check
when the issuer knows there are insufficient funds to
cover the check; the account on which the check is drawn
is closed; or the issuer stops payment on the check issued
for money, goods, credit, or services. Id.
32. Id. § 45-17-112(i).
33. Tenn. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 98-070 (1998).
34. Cf. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-29-101 (1999).
35. Tenn. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 98-070 (1998).
36. TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-17-112(i) (Supp. 1999).
37. Ferrar, supra note 8, at D1.
38. Id. A licensee can only charge 15% of the face amount
of the check or $30, whichever is less, so that a customer’s
check with a $200 face-value 15% equals $30. Because the
maximum amount that a cash-advance business can
charge is $30, the business has a strong incentive not to
advance amounts to the customer greater than $170.

Volume 1 Number 2

Transactions TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW
a $340 cash advance for 30 days, it can charge a
fee of no more than $30, or a 107% annual percentage rate (“APR”). 39 If the licensee makes
two cash advances of $170 for 14 days to the
same customer, it will receive total fees of $60, a
460% APR on each check. While loan splitting is
not expressly proscribed by the Act, the Act seems
to prohibit this action as a device used by the
licensee with the intent to obtain greater charges
than authorized by the Act. 40
Another common scheme of which both customers and cash-advance businesses should be
aware is the “loan rollover” or “renewal.” 41 In a
loan rollover, the licensee accepts a new deferred presentment check immediately after the
customer pays off the earlier deferred presentment check. 42 In essence, the licensee accepts
payment for the old check and gives the same
money back to the customer under the guise of a
new deferred presentment check, in direct violation of the Act. 43 The Act states that “a licensee
shall not renew a deferred presentment transaction with the proceeds of a deferred present-

39. The annual percentage rate (APR) is calculated by
dividing the fee charged by the cash advance received by
the customer. The resulting figure is then multiplied by
the result of dividing 365 days by the number of days of
the cash advance, thus giving the APR. Speaking in terms
of APR is important, yet potentially misleading. Some
cash-advance customers do get cash advances constantly
throughout the year and, in effect, are borrowing at an
annual rate. However, APRs are misleading and somewhat
alarmist because a customer who, once a year, gets a cash
advance of $170 for a fee of $30 for two weeks, is not really
concerned that the APR is 460%; Hendren, supra note 18,
at *.
40. TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-17-112(r) (Supp. 1999) (stating
that a licensee shall not use any device or agreement with
the intent to obtain greater charges than otherwise would
be authorized by this chapter). For example, a licensee
who takes two $170 checks on the same day would seem
to violate this provision because the licensee is getting
two fees for two transactions when the licensee could
consolidate the two cash advances for one fee. Whether
loan splitting violates the provision is less clear where the
two $170 cash advances are made over the course of a
week or within a few days of each other, for that matter.
Would a second cash advance three days after the first
cash advance qualify as a violation of § 45-17-112(r)? The
Volume 1 Number 2
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ment transaction previously made by the same
licensee.” 44 If the cash-advance business violates this provision, its second cash advance is
void, making it unenforceable in law or equity, 45
even if the customer takes the second cash advance and then reports the transaction to the commissioner of financial institutions as a loan rollover,
defrauding the cash-advance business in the process. 46 A “cooling-off” period between cash advances may limit rollovers, but a cash-advance
customer remains free to patronize other cashadvance businesses so a “cooling off” period
would probably be ineffective in the long run. 47
IV. Conclusion
This article set out to explain how cash advances
work in Tennessee as well as to delineate the
Deferred Presentment Services Act while highlighting some of the more practical, non-statutory aspects of the cash-advance business. With
the phenomenal growth of the cash-advance industry in Tennessee, the legal community must

answer would seem to be “no,” but no authority has
addressed this specific question.
41. Ferrar, supra note 8, at D1.
42. Rebecca Ferrar, Check-Advance Regulation Slowed
But Passage Likely, KNOXVILLE NEWS-SENTINEL, Feb. 3,
1999, at B6, available in 1999 WL 9154643.
43. However, rather than paying off the entire amount of
the deferred presentment check, the cash-advance
business usually accepts the amount of the fee in cash
from the customer and agrees to hold the customer’s
check for another fourteen- or thirty-day period. For
instance, a customer who received a $100 cash advance
has a $115 check in the possession of the cash-advance
business. If the customer cannot pay the entire $115, he
can pay the $17.25 fee and delay repayment of the entire
amount for another fourteen- or thirty-day period. The
Act forbids any such transaction, deeming it void and
unenforceable against the customer, regardless of whether
the customer did this with the intent to defraud. TENN .
CODE ANN. § 45-17-112(q) (Supp. 1999).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. It seems rather draconian when the Act would look
the other way in the face of intentional fraud.
47. Ferrar, supra note 8, at D3.
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keep up with this burgeoning market in order to
adequately serve their clients, whether they are
customers of cash-advance services or are in the
business of providing cash advances. Since October 1997, the commissioner of financial institutions reported that of 677 offices operating as
cash-advance businesses in Tennessee, over half
had violated the Deferred Presentment Services
Act in some fashion. 48 However, onl y 23 written complaints were made to the commissioner
among an estimated 1.2 million transactions. 49
While the cash-advance industry is a useful
and highly-regulated sector in Tennessee, the
businesses that engage in this service require
constant supervision to avoid the dangers inherent to the short-term loan industry, such as loan
splitting and loan rollovers. The legal community in Tennessee must be ready and able to
handle the problems that arise from the cashadvance industry because the short-term loan
market shows no signs of slowing down in Tennessee. By increasing the legal community’s
awareness of the risks involved, the Deferred
Presentment Services Act should more effectively
be followed and enforced, benefiting cash-advance businesses and their customers alike.

48. Ferrar, supra note 38, at B6.
49. ds Id.
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